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Abstract
This paper questions the role of cross-border lending in the definition of national macro-
prudential policies in the European Monetary Union. We build and estimate a two-country
DSGE model with corporate and interbank cross-border loans, Core-Periphery diverging
financial cycles and a national implementation of coordinated macroprudential measures
based on Countercyclical Capital Buffers. We get three main results. First, targeting a na-
tional credit-to-GDP ratio should be favored to federal averages as this rule induces better
stabilizing performances in front of important divergences in credit cycles between core and
peripheral countries. Second, policies reacting to the evolution of national credit supply
should be favored as the transmission channel of macroprudential policy directly impacts
the marginal cost of loan production and, by so, financial intermediaries. Third, the interest
of lifting up macroprudential policymaking to the supra-national level remains questionable
for admissible value of international lending between Eurozone countries. Indeed, national
capital buffers reacting to the union-wide loan-to-GDP ratio only lead to the same stabiliza-
tion results than the one obtained under the national reaction if cross-border lending reaches
45%. However, even if cross-border linkages are high enough to justify the implementation of
a federal adjusted solution, the reaction to national lending conditions remains remarkably
optimal.
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1 Introduction
The disruption of financial relations that followed the 2007 subprime crisis set the basis for the
adoption of macroprudential policies in most countries.1 In the Euro Area, the implementation
of such measures remains fragmented along national lines while the coordination and internal-
ization of cross-border spillovers are achieved through the actions of the European Systemic
Risk Board (ESRB, henceforth). This federal organization accounts for two conflicting features
of the Eurozone that can be approached by contrasting core and peripheral countries.2 Panel
(a) of Figure 1 shows that financial cycles (as measured by the credit to GDP ratio in per-
centage deviation from HP trend) remain clearly national, which militates for a decentralized
definition and implementation of macroprudential measures. However, as reported in panel (b)
of Figure 1, these two regions are closely linked by cross-border banking activities (as measured
by the share of loans lent to a foreign agent residing in another Euro Area country) and the
international spillovers of national macroprudential policies may be harmful for the monetary
union. The remaining uncertainties on undesirable side-effects of self oriented macroprudential
policies have thus put global banks at a central stage in the on-going debate related to the
conduct of macroprudential policies.3
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Note: Cross-border lending refers to any financing arrangement that crosses national borders between a domestic bank
and a foreign borrower. The share of cross-border loans is computed here as the ratio between loans to euro area excluding
the domestic area and the loans to euro area (i.e. cross-border loans between core countries are included in the calculation
of the share of international loans). Sources: ESRB and ECB statistics.
Figure 1: Stylized facts characterizing the Eurosystem banking system: credit cycles remain
clearly national while cross-border lending experienced an important growth
This paper questions how sizable cross-border lending flows should be treated in the defini-
tion of national macroprudential policies in the Euro Area. We more particularly assess whether
cross-border bank lending should explicitly be considered in the setting of coordinated national
macroprudential measures or whether national regulators should only focus on the sole national
financial stance to contribute to the financial stability of the Eurozone.
We build and estimate a two-country DSGE model that accounts for two major aspects to
address the question at hands. First, we extend the setup of Poutineau and Vermandel (2015)
1In a nutshell, macroprudential policy aims at completing monetary policy to enhance the resilience of the
financial system and contain the procyclicality of financial factors on activity.
2In the first group we aggregate data for countries with a current account surplus and low government bond
yields over the sample period (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Luxembourg and Netherlands), while
in the second group, we aggregate data for countries with a current account deficit and high government bond
yields over the sample period (Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal).
3For example, regarding issues related to macroprudential policy with global banking, we refer to the IMF
(2013, key issues, p31), the ESRB handbook (2014), ECB (2015, Financial Stability Review, May), Bank of
England (2015, Staff Working Paper).
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- featuring cross-border banking on the corporate and interbank loan markets4 - to account
for bank capital regulation and thus to contrast the effectiveness of macroprudential policy
from banking autarky to perfect integration. Second, in line with the actual organization of
macroprudential policy,5 we focus on the joint-optimization of macroprudential policy rules in
each country using the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB, henceforth) rate as an instrument.
This solution has become one of the leading facets of prudential regulation since the adoption of
Basel III accords (2010) by building up a bank capital buffer during periods of excessive credit
growth that can be released when systemic risks abate. The international dimension of banks
offered by our setting allows us to contrast different CCB rules based on: (i) the federal or the
national credit-to-gdp targeting, (ii) the loan demand (from firms) or supply (from banks) to
GDP targeting, and (iii) the loan inflows-to-GDP ratio targeting as envisaged by Rey (2015).
The methodology employed in this paper comprises three steps. First, we build and esti-
mate a two-country DSGE model for the Euro Area with only monetary policy (as there are
no observations for an estimation of a macroprudential rule). Second, we compute the optimal
policy rules (both monetary and macroprudential policy) given the estimated parameters as-
suming a two-stage game where monetary policy is the leader.6 Third, we examine implications
of cross-border lending on the optimal design of macroprudential rules across country members
of the Eurosystem using the optimal monetary policy rule as a benchmark.
The main result of the paper suggests that self oriented macroprudential national policies
reacting to the evolution of home country loan creation should be favored even with high
amounts of cross-border lending flows: First, targeting a national credit-to-gdp ratio should
be favored to federal averages as this rule induces better stabilizing performances in front of
important divergences in credit cycles between core and peripheral countries. Second, policies
reacting to the evolution of national credit supply should be favored as the transmission channel
of macroprudential policy directly impacts the marginal cost of loan production and, by so,
financial intermediaries. Third, the interest of lifting up macroprudential policymaking to the
supra-national level remains questionable for admissible value of international lending between
Eurozone countries. Indeed, national capital buffers reacting to the union-wide loan-to-GDP
ratio only lead to the same stabilization results than the one obtained under the national
reaction if cross-border lending reaches 45%. However, even if cross-border linkages are high
enough to justify the implementation of a federal adjusted solution, the reaction to national
lending conditions remains remarkably optimal.
Additionally, we outline some particularities regarding the conduct of macroprudential poli-
cies for peripheral countries. We find that adjusting the macroprudential instrument to capital
inflows-to-GDP is a promising tool for these countries that have experienced a large amount
of loan inflows. Furthermore, disentangling the demand/supply of credit has implications for
macroprudential policymaking as it is preferable to target credit suppliers for core countries
and borrowers for peripheral economies.
Our approach is partly related to a set of papers examining macroprudential measures in
the Eurozone with a closed economy setup. Notably, Darracq-Parie`s et al. (2011) and Angelini
et al. (2014) build a DSGE model of the Eurozone close to Gerali et al. (2010) with both
corporate and housing credit markets and evaluate the optimal mix between monetary and
4In this paper, we omit the mortgage market and concentrate on corporate and interbank loans. Given the
insignificant size of cross-border housing loans in the portfolio of banks (the share of cross-border loans is below
1% in the Euro Area according to ECB internal data), this omission does not seem to be important for the
analysis conducted here.
5We refer to Carboni et al. (2013) for a discussion regarding the macroprudential policy mandate in the
Euro Area shared between European Central Bank and the Single Supervisory Mechanism, national competent
authorities and coordinated by the European Systemic Risk Board.
6A important branch of the literature analyzed the interaction between monetary policy and financial stability,
a topic not covered in the paper as we concentrate here on interactions between national prudential authorities.
We refer to Woodford (2012) for a summary of policy challenges and results offered by the existing literature
concerning the role of monetary policy in providing financial stability.
3
macroprudential policy using loss functions. As a key contribution to the literature, they suggest
that time-varying capital requirements can improve macroeconomic stability by supporting
monetary policy actions. Our analysis can thus be considered as an extension to these papers,
by accounting for the heterogeneity between Euro Area participants and the existence of national
macroprudential policies with cross-border spillovers.
Our paper also contributes to macroprudential policy analysis in open economies. As an
example, Quint and Rabanal (2014) account for financial asymmetries between participating
countries and focus on the interaction between financial and housing cycles without considering
cross-border flows between countries. By omitting cross-border lending, they naturally find that
there are no important spillover effects of regulation from one member state to another via an
estimated two-country DSGE model of the Eurozone. Additionally, Jeanne (2014) employs a
static open economy model to evaluate the effectiveness of macroprudential and capital con-
trol measures. Contrary to Quint and Rabanal (2014), he finds that these prudential policies
generate important global spillovers even with international coordination.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the financial sector of the model.
Section 3 takes the model to the data. Section 4 discusses the performance of macroprudential
policy. Section 5 provides a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of our results. Section 6
concludes.
2 The financial sector
The economy is composed of two countries of unequal size and populated by households, firms
and banks. This first section describes the banking component of the model while the rest of
the framework (standard to the literature) is presented in appendix.
2.1 The financial sector in a nutshell
Figure 2 provides a broad picture of the financial sector and summarizes its interaction with
the rest of the economy. Banks engage in interbank lending/borrowing relations and provide
corporate loans to entrepreneurs and deposit services to households. Authorities affect the
decisions of the banking sector through monetary and macroprudential policies.
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Figure 2: Macroprudential policy and cross-border banking in a New Keynesian Framework
To introduce an interbank market, we assume that banks are heterogenous in terms of liq-
uidity. This feature gives rise to an interbank market where liquid banks provide interbank
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loans to both home and foreign banks. This feature is line with the current European banking
system characterized by banks relying on wholesale fundings as illustrated by Giannone et al.
(2012). In our setup, the distinction between liquid and illiquid banks lies in the direct ac-
cess of liquid banks to ECB fundings which allow intra-financial sector flows between financial
intermediaries.7 Extending this assumption to an international perspective, illiquid banks can
borrow from both domestic and foreign liquid banks, which gives rise to cross-border interbank
lending flows. The decision of the banking system regarding the provision of deposit services
to households and loans to the corporate sector affects the rest of the economy through the
setting of deposit and lending interest rates.8 In line with the EMU situation, we do not con-
sider cross-border deposit nor cross-border lending to households. The international flow of
loans between economies is thus a consequence of interbank liquidity provision and borrowing
choices undertaken by entrepreneurs (following a comparison between the relative interest rates
of domestic and foreign corporate loans).
This paper adopts a macroeconomic perspective to focus on the effect of cross-border lending
on the conduct of macroprudential policy in a heterogeneous monetary union. As a consequence,
the financial sector is combined with a standard two-country DSGE model accounting for short
run rigidities in goods prices and nominal wages. In what follows, we outline the main assump-
tions regarding the functioning of the financial sector that are deemed necessary to improve
both the tractability of the analysis and the estimation of the many behavioral parameters of
the DSGE structure. Some modelling choices have been done in line with the DSGE literature
that contrast with a more standard description of the behavior of the banking sector as sum-
marized by Freixas and Rochet (2008) and VanHoose (2009). As in the initial contribution of
Gerali et al. (2010), this macro superstructure is augmented with a highly simplified banking
model. A host of assumptions should be invoked that effectively splinter a bank’s decisions into
independent choices about different portions of its balance sheet.9
This paper extends Poutineau and Vermandel (2015) to account for deposit decisions and for
macroprudential consideration in the balance sheets of financial intermediaries. The stickiness
in both deposit and loan interest rates is a key ingredient of the framework. The setting of
interest rate mimics the way other sticky nominal variables such as prices and wages are set in
the model by adopting a Calvo-type mechanism. This device, shared by most DSGE models
with a banking sector, partly contrasts with the literature developed from the banking indus-
try perspective. Indeed, most of the banking literature has, following Flannery (1982) original
work on deposits as quasi-fixed factors, focused on intertemporal quantity adjustment costs. It
is also worth noting that the substantial banking literature on this topic has proposed alterna-
tive ways of approaching this question, including Cosimano and Van Huyck (1989), Cosimano
(1987, 1988), and Elyasiani et al. (1995) and Abo-Zaid (2015). Furthermore, sluggish and even
asymmetric variations in bank retail rates have been documented in the empirical literature as
7This assumption is empirically motivated: in the Eurosystem, only a fraction of the 2500 banks participates
regularly to the bidding process in main refinancing operations of the ECB while the others rely on interbank
funding.
8For tractability reasons we assume that even if banks differ in their ability to raise funds from the central
bank, their loan and deposit supply decisions remain homogenous after aggregation. In a real life situation,
illiquid banks may face more difficulties in attracting households deposits requiring banks to set higher deposit
rates to compensate their default risk. Regarding corproate loans provision, the tighter funding constraint of
illiquid may diminish their loan supply compared to liquid banks.
9First, portfolio separation holds (Baltensperger (1980) and Santomero (1984)), which means (Sealey and
Lindley (1977) and Sealey (1985)) that a number of assumptions have been invoked. For instance, either share-
holder unanimity is assumed for all banks in the model, or risk neutrality has been assumed to render shareholder
unanimity a non-issue. In addition, it must be assumed that banks’ costs of real resources utilized in their oper-
ations are separable from resource costs for others of the banks’ assets and liabilities at during each period and
across periods if interperiod adjustment costs are taken into account. Finally, banks must have access to a market
in which they can both borrow and lend at exactly the same interest rate. Only when all such assumptions are
invoked, it is legitimate for each bank to be able to make separable decisions about balance-sheet choices as
assumed in this model.
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in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) through imperfect competition among banking systems, while
Kopecky and Van Hoose (2012) rely on intertemporal quantity adjustment costs together with
imperfect competition to explain such observations. The adoption of a Calvo mechanism com-
bined with monopolistic competition has been employed here in a macro-perspective for credit
and deposit interest rates, as this solution allows us to consider the sluggishness in the adjust-
ment of all the nominal variables of the economy (prices, wages and interest rates) through the
estimation of a ”Calvo lottery parameter”.
As a second major noticeable difference from Poutineau and Vermandel (2015), we account
for endogenous leverage of financial intermediaries, thus reflecting the riskiness in the balance
sheet of banks. We use time-varying capital requirements as the macroprudential instrument.
As underlined by Angelini et al. (2014), capital buffers have taken a center stage in the ongoing
debate on regulatory reform and have become one of leading facet of macroprudential regu-
lation. Specifically in the European Union, a number of macro-prudential policy instruments
including countercyclical buffers are embedded in the legislative texts transposing the Basel III
regulatory standards into EU law.10 To account for this compulsory macroprudential instru-
ment, we borrow the modelling device of Darracq-Parie`s et al. (2011) and Angelini et al. (2014)
by assuming that each type of bank must pay a quadratic cost when its risk weighted assets
ratio deviates from the time-varying ratio fixed by the macroprudential authority in country
i according to the systemic risk arising within the financial system. The decision to penalize
banks for keeping equity-capital positions below the official benchmark is easy to understand,
as undercapitalized banks make the banking sector more fragile and in turn subject to bank
runs (Diamond and Rajan (2001)). Symmetrically, the decision to impose costs on banks for
having equity-capital positions above the required levels may be understood in a macroeconomic
perspective: by keeping more equity capital levels than required by the official regulation, the
banking sector diverts resources and, in turn, creates credit rationing for both entrepreneurs
and illiquid banks. This may create lower than desired banking activity, reduce investment in
the economy and incur inefficiencies.11
2.2 Interbank relations
In each country the banking system consists of two distinct branches: a continuum of mo-
nopolistic banks and financial packers. Monopolistic banks provide different types of loans and
deposit services and set interest rates on a Calvo basis. The financial intermediary is a CES
packer that produces one homogenous loan and deposit service.12 A share λ of banks is illiquid
(i.e. credit constrained), while the remaining share of banks 1-λ is liquid and supplies interbank
loans to illiquid banks.
10Namely the new Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR).
We refer to Carboni et al. (2013) for a discussion regarding the macroprudential policy mandate in the Euro Area
shared between ECB/SSM, national competent authorities and coordinated by the ESRB.
11Van den Heuvel (2008) finds using a general equilibrium model that increasing capital requirements induces
high welfare costs in terms of unconditional consumption, suggesting that capital requirements should be lower
than in the current adequacy framework. Clerc et al. (2015) highlight the presence of a tradeoff using a financial
accelerator model between too high and too low capital requirements.
12The financial packer acts as a loan and deposit bundler in a perfectly competitive market. Banks sup-
ply differentiated types b of deposits Di,t (b) and loans L
s
i,t (b) bundled by financial packers. Their pack-
ing technology for deposit services and loans reads as, Ddi,t = [(1/ni)
1/D G(Di,t (b)(D−1)/D )]D/(D−1), and
Ldi,t = [(1/ni)
1/L G(Lsi,t (b)(L−1)/L)]L/(L−1). It maximizes profits, RDi,tDdi,t + RLi,tLdi,t − G(RDi,t (b)Di,t (b)) −
G(RLi,t (b)Lsi,t (b)), subject to their two technology curves. Here, Ldi,t is the loans demand from home and for-
eign entrepreneurs, Ddi,t is the deposit services demand from domestic households and G (.) is the aggregator
function. Deposits and loans are imperfect substitute with elasticity of substitution D < −1 and L > 1. The
corresponding demand functions associated from the previous problem are, Di,t (b) = (1/ni)(R
D
i,t(b)/R
D
i,t)
−DDdi,t
and Lsi,t (b) = (1/ni)(R
L
i,t(b)/R
L
i,t)
−LLdi,t. The aggregate price index of all varieties in the economy is given by,
RDi,t = [(1/ni)G(RDi,t (b)1−D )]1/(1−D) and RLi,t = [(1/ni)G(RLi,t (b)1−L)]1/(1−L).
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The representative share λ of illiquid banks b in country i has the following balance sheet,
Lsi,t = IB
H
i,t +BK
ill
i,t +Di,t + liab
ill
i,t, (1)
where Lsi,t is the loan supply of borrowing banks, IB
H
i,t is the interbank loans supplied by
liquid banks subject to external habits, BKilli,t is the bank capital, Di,t are deposit services
to households and liabi,t are other liabilities in the balance sheet of the bank that are not
considered in the model.13 To close the model, we assume that the cost of these liabilities is set
by the central bank through its refinancing rate. We suppose that the demand for interbank
funds are subject to external habits at a degree hBi where IB
H
i,t = IB
d
i,t − hBi (IBdi,t−1 − IB
d
i ).
These habits captures the empirical autocorrelation of interbank funding. In addition, these
habits are empirically documented in the interbank network literature: Finger et al. (2014,
2015) find at a bank level that bilateral links between banks are persistent as banks heavily
rely on well-established business relations, thus exhibiting some habits in borrowing/lending
decisions.
The one-period stream of profits of the b-th illiquid bank is given by:
Πilli,t =
[
1− µB (1− Et {ηi,t+1})
] (
1 +RLi,t
)
Lsi,t −
(
1 +RDi,t
)
Di,t −
(
1 + P IBi,t
)
IBHi,t (2)
− (1 +Rt) liabilli,t − F
(
rwailli,t − vi,t
)
BKilli,t ,
where µB ∈ [0, 1] denotes the loss-given-default (i.e. the percentage of the amount owed on a
defaulted loan that the bank is not able to recover), 1−Et {ηi,t+1} is the expected average default
rate of the bank’s home and foreign customers,14 RDi,t is deposit rate, P
IB
i,t is the borrowing cost
on the interbank, Rt the interest rate set by the central bank and Fi (·) denotes the capital
requirement cost function. This cost function is taken from Gerali et al. (2010) and is defined
as Fi (x) = 0.5χ
kx2 where χk ≥ 0 is the cost of capital adequacy framework paid in term
of bank capital.15 This cost function is a shortcut that makes bank capital more costly than
any source of financing, and allows in turn to mimic the response of credit rates and credit to
a capital requirement tightening consistently with empirical evidence (see for instance Fraisse
et al. (2013) for an empirical measure of this elasticity). When the bank capital-to-risky-asset
ratio rwailli,t is below the policy target υit, the bank is penalized by regulatory rules that affect the
borrowing rates in the monetary union and in turn damage output. This penalization replicates
the market discipline imposed by investors on low capitalized banks, forcing the latter to boost
their retained earnings though higher credit rates. The risk is evaluated through fixed weights
on assets, based on the type of the borrowers (1 for corporate exposure and 0.20 for interbank
exposure between OECD banks as defined in Basel accords) as defined in Basel I accords. Since
illiquid banks are only exposed to corporate risk, the risk weighted assets ratio is given by
rwailli,t = BK
ill
i,t/L
s
i,t. In addition, the financial intermediary has access to domestic and foreign
interbank loans to meet its balance sheet. The modelling device to introduce international
borrowing is analogous to trade channels through a CES as in Poutineau and Vermandel (2015)
and Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015). The total amount borrowed by the representative bank reads
13We suppose that they follow an exogenous AR(1) shock process εBi,t such that, liabi,t = e
εBi,t liabi, this shock
captures some aggregate movements in the funding constraint araising from the wholesale funding market, see
for instance Pe´rignon et al. (2017) for an analysis of liquidity runs on the French unsecured market of certificates
of deposits.
14To simplify both the steady state and the log-linear version of the model, the bank default expectation regard-
ing entrepreneurs’ projects is defined by a geometric average of home and foreign surviving rates of entrepreneurs,
ηi,t = (η
E
h,t)
1−αLh (ηEf,t)
αLj η¯
αLh−αLj where ηEi,t+1is the default rate of entrepreneurs operating in country i ∈ {c, p}.
The expression η¯
αLh−αLj ensures the detesministic steady state remains symmetric between Core and Periphery
without affecting the dynamic of the model up to a first order approximation.
15The quadratic nature of this cost has been discussed in the previous subsection.
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as follows:
IBdi,t =
((
1− αIBi
)1/ξ (
IBdhi,t
)(ξ−1)/ξ
+
(
αIBi
)1/ξ (
IBdfi,t
)(ξ−1)/ξ)ξ/(ξ−1)
, (3)
where parameter ξ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign interbank
funds, αIBi represents the percentage of cross-border interbank loan flows in the monetary
union and IBdhi,t+1 (resp. IB
d
fi,t+1) the amount of domestic (resp. foreign) loans demanded
by borrowing bank b in country i. This existence of an home bias on the interbank market is
empirically motivated, Fricke and Lux (2015) find, using Italian bank-level data, that Italian
banks tend to trade with each other rather than with foreign banks, in particular after the
financial turmoil. More broadly in the literature of finance, the home bias in portfolio was first
documented by French and Poterba (1991).
The total cost incurred by illiquid banks to finance interbank loans, 1 +P IBi,t , is thus defined
according to the CES aggregator:
1 + P IBi,t = (
(
1− αIBi
)
(1 +RIBh,t )
1−ξ + αIBi (1 +R
IB
f,t )
1−ξ)1/(1−ξ), (4)
where 1 + RIBh,t (resp. 1 + R
IB
f,t ) is the cost of loans obtained from home (resp. foreign) banks
in country i. Finally following Gerali et al. (2010), the bank capital accumulation process of
illiquid banks (BKilli,t) is determined by:
BKilli,t =
(
1− δilli
)
Πilli,t−1, (5)
where δilli ∈ [0, 1] measures resources used in managing bank capital and conducting the overall
banking intermediation activity and is determined endogenously by the steady state of the
model. Given the functional form of Fi (·), the first order condition on loans which determines
the marginal cost of supplying an additional unit of loans to home and foreign entrepreneurs is:
1 +MCilli,t =
1 + P IBi,t + χ
k
(
vi,t − rwailli,t
)(
rwailli,t
)2
1− µB (1− Et {ηi,t+1}) . (6)
From this equation, we observe that an increase (reduction) in the CCB rate υi,t (risk weighted
assets ratio rwailli,t) imposes on banks to accumulate more equity via retained earnings through a
rise in credit rates. Parameter χk determines the elasticity of interest rates to capital regulation
change.16 During phases of expansion, banks have incentives to increase their leverage away
from the target in order to boost their profits. This risk taking by banks is addressed in our
model though the cost function that forces banks to control their capital structure.
The fraction 1− λ of remaining liquid banks has the following balance sheet:
Lsi,t + IB
s
i,t = L
ECB
i,t +BK
liq
i,t +Di,t + liab
liq
i,t , (7)
where Lsi,t is the lending supply to entrepreneurs, IB
s
i,t is the supply of funds on the interbank
market, LECBi,t is the amount of refinancing operations obtained by the liquid bank, BK
liq
i,t is
the amount of bank capital, Di,t are deposits collected from domestic households and liabi,t are
exogenous liabilities as explained previously. The one-period profit of the bank Πliqi,t is defined
as:
Πliqi,t =
(
1− µB (1− Et {ηi,t+1})
) (
1 +RLi,t
)
Lsi,t +
(
1 +RIBi,t
)
IBsi,t −
(
1 +RDi,t
)
Di,t (8)
− (1 +Rt) liabliqi,t − (1 +Rt)LECBi,t − F (rwaliqi,t − υit)BK liqi,t .
16Empirically, Fraisse et al. (2013) find at a bank level that one percentage increase in capital requirements
leads to a reduction in lending by approximately 10%.
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Here, RIBi,t is the interest rate set by liquid banks to home and foreign illiquid banks, Rt is
the refinancing rate of the central bank and Fi (·) denotes the same Basel cost function as for
illiquid banks: Fi (x) = 0.5χ
kx2. Interbank claims affect the amount of equity held by banks
and are given a risk weight at 20%. The risk weighted asset ratio for liquid bank incorporating
corporate and bank exposures is given by rwaliqi,t = BK
liq
i,t /(L
s
i,t + 0.2IB
s
i,t). According to the
illiquid bank, bank capital of liquid banks evolves according to
BK liqi,t = (1− δliqi )Πliqi,t−1, (9)
where δliqi ∈ [0, 1] is similar to the illiquid bank and measures the fraction of capital used during
the intermediation process that cannot be re-invested next period. The first order condition on
loans determining the marginal cost of loans of the liquid bank b is:
1 +MC liqi,t =
1 +Rt + χ
k
(
vi,t − rwaliqi,t
)(
rwaliqi,t
)2
1− µB (1− Et{ηi,t+1}) , (10)
and the second first order condition on interbank loans determines the interbank rate set by
banks operating in country i:
RIBi,t = Rt + 0.2χ
k(vi,t − rwaliqi,t )(rwaliqi,t )2. (11)
Here again, an increase in bank capital requirements raises the bank’s cost of lending, and
in turn increases both interbank and corporate interest rates. This result is consistent with
standard business cycle models and is referred to the bank capital channel as in Van den Heuvel
(2008), Meh and Moran (2010), Darracq-Parie`s et al. (2011) and Angelini et al. (2014).
2.3 Interest rate setting
We assume that interest rates on deposits and corporate credit loans are sticky. In particular,
sluggish and even asymmetric variations in bank retail rates have been documented in the
empirical literature as in Kopecky and Van Hoose (2012) and Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013)
through imperfect competition among banking systems. The setting of interest rate mimics
the way other sticky nominal variables such as prices and wages are set in the model. As in
Darracq-Parie`s et al. (2011), we introduce a Calvo model for credit rates to firms and deposit
rates while the interbank rate is left flexible as banks operate under perfect competition on the
interbank market. Banks must solve a two-stage problem. In the first stage, banks minimize the
cost of managing their funds on a competitive input markets by computing the marginal cost of
supplying an additional loan to borrowers and a deposit service to households. The computation
of these marginal costs has already been performed in the previous subsection. In a second
stage, they operate under monopolistic competition by applying a markup (markdown) on their
commercial loan (deposit) rate, and set the interest rate on a staggered basis. Using a Calvo
nominal rigidity device, each period a random fraction θLi (θ
D
i ) of banks is unable to update
its lending (deposit) rate, RLi,t = R
L
i,t−1 (R
D
i,t = R
D
i,t−1), creating an imperfect transmission of
monetary policy decisions to borrowers and savers living in the monetary union. The bank that
it is able to modify its loan interest rate (with a constant probability 1 − θLi ) chooses RL∗i,t to
maximize its expected stream of profits adjusted by the risk of default:
Et
∑∞
s=0
(
θLi
)τ
Λi,t+s
(
1− µB (1− ηi,t+1+τ )
) [
RL∗i,t − exp(εLi,t+s)MCLi,t+s
]
Lsi,t+s, (12)
where εLi,t is an ad-hoc markup AR(1) shock to the credit rate equation, θ
L
i ∈ [0, 1) is the
Calvo lottery coefficient determining the degree of nominal rigidity and MCLi,t is the aggregate
marginal cost combining outputs from liquid and illiquid banks of country i. We aggregate loans
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from liquid and illiquid banks and their respective marginal costs before applying the markup
for tractability purposes: this device is useful to compute a single Phillips curve as well as an
unique credit rate for both liquid and illiquid banks. We borrow this shortcut procedure from
Gerali et al. (2010) adapted in a different context, i.e. all banks belonging to a national banking
system share the same marginal cost of production, reflecting the average liquidity degree of
national banks: 1 + MCLi,t = (1 + MC
ill
i,t)
λ(1 + MC liqi,t )
(1−λ). In addition, the banking spread
reflecting the level of financial distress is given by SLi,t = (1 +R
L
i,t)/(1 +Rt).
In a similar fashion for deposit rates, assuming that it is able to modify its interest rate with
a constant probability 1 − θDi , the representative bank chooses RD∗i,t to maximize its expected
stream of profits, by applying a markdown on the refinancing rate of the central bank Rt:
Et
∑∞
τ=0
(
θDi
)τ
Λi,t+s
[
Rt+s exp(ε
D
i,t+s)−RD∗i,t
]
Di,t+s, (13)
where εDi,t is an ad-hoc time-varying AR(1) markdown shock to the deposit rate equation and
θDi ∈ [0, 1) is the Calvo lottery parameter.
2.4 Macroprudential policy
Macroprudential policy affects the general equilibrium of the economy through the policy instru-
ment vi,t that contributes to the marginal cost of commercial banks’ loans. As a consequence, a
macroprudential policy tightening is associated with higher lending rates, and lower bank credit
growth and asset prices. We assume that the macroprudential authority sets the time-varying
capital requirement νi,t according to:
vi,t = (1− ρvi ) ν¯ + ρvi νi,t−1 + φi(Ti,t − T¯i), (14)
where ρvi ∈ [0, 1) is the smoothing coefficient of the rule, Ti,t is the macroprudential target,
φi ≥ 0 is the macroprudential weight to the target in country i and T¯i is the steady state of
the target. In our specification, capital requirements are expected to increase when the target
deviates from its steady state. The choice of the target Ti,t is a key aspect of the paper that
will be discussed below.
The ESRB has developed a buffer guide to choose the CCB rate based on the credit-to-gdp
gap.17 However, the global nature of the European banking system introduces many possi-
bilities for the definition of the credit-to-gdp ratio taken into account by national authorities.
Indeed, the CCB rate may be adjusted to the credit supply (of banks) or the credit demand (of
entrepreneurs),18 either on a national or on a federal basis. Our framework with international
bank flows allows us to distinguish between five operational targets as listed in Table 1.
The first set of credit targeting rules is oriented towards the supply of credit using either
a federal (1.a) or a country-specific aggregate (1.b). A macroprudential policy based on credit
supply aims at stabilizing lenders by focusing more on the stabilization of financial shocks
hitting lenders rather than demand and supply shocks hitting borrowers. Given the scale of
cross-border loans in the Eurozone, the decisions of the national supervisor has side effects
on countries where a national bank has a subsidiary or branches or where this bank lends to
may favor a federal definition of the ratio. Thus to handle these pecuniary externalities, we
evaluate the possibility of an union-wide targeting system (1.a) against a national targeting
system (1.b), the latter being expected to create more externalities (positive or negative) as it
affects the foreign banking system without taking into account its financial developments.19
17Other indicators (such as early warning variables) are included in the CCB guide which are not implementable
in our model.
18In an open economy context where banks can lend across borders, banks supply credit to both home and
foreign, which creates a gap between the domestic supply and the domestic demand for loans. This distinction
between demand and supply is easy to see on the market clearing conditions of interbank (Equation 40) and
corporate markets (39).
19For further discussions of these cross-border issues, we refer to Beck et al. (2016).
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Table 1
Various Macroprudential Policy Schemes in terms of Target (average in the monetary union,
national supply or national target) and in terms of policy stance (common or national-adjusted)
Schemes Target
Loan Supply Targeting
1.a Union-wide loan supply Tt = (Lst + (1− λ)IBst )/Yt
1.b National loan supply Ti,t = (Lsi,t + (1− λ)IBsi,t)/Yi,t for i ∈ {c, p}
Loan Demand Targeting
2.a Union-wide loan demand Tt = (Ldt + λIBdt )/Yt
2.b National loan demand Ti,t = (Ldi,t + λIBdi,t)/Yi,t for i ∈ {c, p}
Capital Inflows Targeting
3 Capital Inflows Ti,t = (Ldi,t − Lsi,t + λIBdi,t − (1− λ)IBsi,t)/Yi,t for i ∈ {c, p}
Note: variables without country subscript such as xt denote union-wide averages computed as a weighted sum of each
country xt = nxc,t + (1− n)xp,t.
The second set of credit targeting rules concentrates on the demand of credit emanating
from entrepreneurs.20 The interest of a CCB rate tailored to borrowers is that it may provide
more stabilization following real and nominal shocks hitting households and firms at the ex-
pense of financial shocks affecting banks. This solution seeks at internalizing the social cost of
entrepreneurs’ over-borrowing that may arise given their biased expectations. As this policy
regime inefficiently affects foreign borrowers through cross-border lending, spillovers effects may
be dampened by a federal targeting (2.a) rather than a national one (2.b).
We also evaluate the interest of adopting provisional measures to affect cross border lending
directly, through targeting capital inflows in the CCB. This solution, as envisaged by Jeanne
and Korinek (2010), Brunnermeier et al. (2012) and Rey (2015), is relatively similar to a capital
control measure. The main insight behind this scheme would rely on the fact that persistent
capital account imbalances induce financial stability risks and may have implications for the
sustainability of net external asset positions. In particular since the creation in the Eurozone,
global banking has experienced an explosive growth helping to fuel unsustainable credit booms
in peripheral economies such as in Spain and in Ireland, followed by a sudden stop in capital
inflows compensated by unconventional measures. Macroprudential policies can play a key role
to contain this problem by imposing targeted regulations on banks engaged in cross-border
activities. When borrowing to other European banks is increasing faster with respect to the
GDP, a national authority can rise the CCB rate to affect banks’ balance sheet management
and reduce their exposure to international borrowing. In addition when system risks abate in
one economy, leading to capital flow reversals, national authorities may release the buffer thus
loosening the banks’ funding constraint to address the procyclicality of capital flows.
3 Estimation strategy
We fit the previous two country DSGE to Eurozone data over the sample time period 1999Q1-
2013Q4 using Bayesian techniques. We estimate structural parameters and the sequence of
shocks by following the seminal contributions of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and Christiano
20A loan demand targeting is feasible in a real life situation, the ECB already disentangles the credit demand
and supply by collecting the domestic and cross-border positions of Euro area monetary financial institutions
since 1999 for each participant of the monetary union. Regarding the demand side of credit markets, the bank
lending survey published by the ECB on a quarterly basis provides an analysis of the driving forces of the demand
of credit in the Euro Area. For the supply side, both the ECB and the BIS collect domestic and cross-border
positions of euro area monetary financial institutions.
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et al. (2005). For a detailed description, we refer to the original papers.
3.1 Data
We split the Eurozone in two groups adopting the core-periphery dichotomy as in Quint and
Rabanal (2014) and Poutineau and Vermandel (2015). Core countries gather Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Finland, France, Luxembourg and Netherlands while peripheral countries include
Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. The model is estimated with Bayesian methods on
Eurozone quarterly data over the sample period 1999Q1 to 2013Q4, which makes 60 observations
for each observable variable. Concerning the transformation of series, the point is to map non-
stationary data to a stationary model. Data which are known to have a trend (namely GDP,
consumption, investment, corporate loan and interbank supply) or unit root are made stationary
in two steps. First, we divide the sample by the population. Second, data are taken in logs and
we use a first difference filtering to obtain growth rates. In addition, real variables are deflated by
the HICP price index and we remove the seasonal component in the data using a multiplicative
decomposition. Furthermore, we demean the data as we do not use the information contained
in the observable mean. Interest rates are set on a quarterly basis by dividing them by 4.
Since hours worked are not observable for the Euro Area, we adopt the same modelling strategy
as Smets and Wouters (2003) to identify TFP shocks using employment as a proxy for hours
worked. Employment is divided by the working population index, taken in logs and demeaned.
To map employment to hours worked in our model, we introduce an auxiliary equation for
each country which states that only a share θEi ∈ [0, 1) of firms is allowed to adjust its level of
employment eˆi,t to its optimal labor demand H
d
i,t:
eˆi,t = βeˆi,t+1 +
(
1− βθEi
) (
1− θEi
)
/θEi
(
log
(
Hdi,t/H¯
d
)
− eˆi,t
)
. (15)
The vector of observable variables reads as:
Yt = 100[∆yˆi,t, eˆi,t,∆cˆi,t,∆ıˆi,t, pˆiCi,t,∆wˆi,t, rˆDi,t,∆lˆsi,t,∆îb
s
i,t, rˆt] for i = {c, p}.
3.2 Calibration, priors and model assumptions
We fix a small number of parameters commonly used in the literature of real business cycles
models which are weakly identified. The discount factor β is set at 0.99, the depreciation rate
δ at 0.025, the capital share α at 0.38, the share of steady state hours worked H¯ at 1, the
spending to GDP ratio g at 24%.21 Concerning P and W (the substitutability between final
goods and labor), we consider the calibration at 10 as in Smets and Wouters (2007). Regarding
financial parameters, we fix N¯/K¯ (the net worth to capital) ratio to 0.40 to be consistent
with the observed debt-to-financial assets ratio of non-financial corporations which fluctuates
between 50% and 65% since 1999. The steady state value of spreads and the bank balance
sheet are calibrated on their averages observed over the sample period in the Euro Area: R¯-
R¯D=1.66/400, R¯L-R¯D=3.67/400, D¯/L¯s=0.46, rwa=v¯=0.10 and IB
d
/L¯s=0.20. The capital
regulation cost χk is set at 11 as in Gerali et al. (2010) to replicate the response of credit and
interest rate to a capital requirement rise.
For substitution parameters for corporate and interbank loans υ and ξ as well as for the
fraction of illiquid banks λ, to our knowledge there are no empirical analysis using bank level
data that provides an estimation of these parameters. We rely on the previous fit exercise of
Poutineau and Vermandel (2015) by calibrating λ at 0.38 and υ, ξ at 1.1. The latter calibra-
tion for substitution parameters is rather conservative by allowing very low substitution effects
21This calibration offers a consumption-to-output ratio of 55.45% (vs 57.31% in the data) and investment-to-
output ratio of 20.55% (vs 20.70% in the data).
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between home and foreign loans.22 The quarterly share of defaulting firms’ projects 1 − η¯E is
fixed at 0.025/4,23 and the auditing cost µB at 0.10,24 those values are very similar to Bernanke
et al. (1999). We compute the parameter governing the relative size of the core area n at 0.58
as in Kolasa (2009), which is the share implied by nominal GDP levels averaged over the pe-
riod 1999-2013. We calibrate symmetrically the adjustment cost on deposits χDi at 0.0007 as
in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) to remove an unit root component generated by the two-
country set-up. Finally, the lower bound ωmin and the shape κ of the Pareto distribution are
endogenously determined by the model equations assuming a risk-free economy with no spread
and default, we obtain: ωmin=1-N¯/K¯ and κ=K¯/N¯ . Our calibration delivers for the main en-
dogenous variables the following steady state: ω¯C=0.6015, εD=-2.41, εL=4.37, r¯L=0.0192 and
r¯K=0.0166.
Our priors are listed in Table 7. Overall, they are either relatively uninformative or consistent
with earlier contributions to Bayesian estimations. For a majority of new Keynesian models’
parameters, i.e. σLi , h
C
i , θ
P
i , ξ
P
i , θ
W
i , ξ
W
i , θ
E
i , χ
I
i , ψi, φ
pi, φ∆y and shock processes parameters,
we use the prior distributions close to Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). Calvo probabilities
for rates have the same uninformative priors as for prices/wages while loans habits are given a
prior mean 0.5 with standard deviation 0.2. Our priors for openness parameters are based on
their observed average over the sample period. Substitutabilities between home/foreign credit
and final goods are set to 2 with standard deviations of 0.50. We set the prior for the elasticity
of the external finance premium κi to a beta distribution with prior mean equal to 0.05 and
standard deviation 0.02 consistent with prior information of Gilchrist et al. (2009). Finally, in
order to catch up the correlation and co-movements between countries’ aggregates, we estimate
the cross-country correlation between structural shocks, associated priors are inspired by in
Jondeau et al. (2006) and Kolasa (2009), we set the mean of the prior distribution for shock
correlations between core countries and peripheral countries at 0.2 with a standard deviation
at 0.2.
Finally, regarding bank capital regulation for the fit exercise, we disable the macroprudential
instrument by fixing the CCB rate to its deterministic steady state value:
νi,t = v¯. (16)
This assumption is reasonable for two main reasons. First over the sample period, capital
regulation has been mainly dominated by the Basel I Accords characterized by fixed capital
requirement ratios. Second, even through the adoption of the Basel III Accords allows Euro
Area countries to employ the countercyclical capital buffer as a shield against the build up of
financial imbalances, it has not been yet employed by a participant of the monetary union.25
22In contrast, Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015) assign a value of 6 to their substitution parameter, which is rather
high with respect to the literature of trade. In general, substitution parameters for goods market are rather low
and usually remain between 1 and 2 as in Quint and Rabanal (2014) or Poutineau and Vermandel (2015).
23This is consistent with corporate default statistics from Moody’s, the rating agency, which show an average
default rate on (non-US) non-financial corporate bonds of 0.75% for the period 1989-2009, as shown by Darracq-
Parie`s et al. (2011). The other rating agency Standards & Poor’s evaluates the rate of default for the period
1991-2014 to 0.58%. We consider a default rate of 0.63% which is in the ballpark of the numbers found by rating
agencies.
24The auditing cost cannot be observed as few data on loan losses are publicly available for reasons of confi-
dentiality. Dermine and De Carvalho (2006) find using bank level data that these costs critically depends on the
size of the loans: recovery costs on smaller loans are substantially higher than on large loans, 4.1% vs. 0.9%. In
addition, once the contentious department has to rely on external lawyers, the recovery costs rise to 10.4%.
25The ESRB offers on its website an interactive map of the Euro Area on countercyclical capital buffers. To this
date, only Sweden and Norway have activated the CCB rate in the European Union but both of these countries
are not Euro Area participants.
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3.3 Estimation results
The methodology employed is standard to the Bayesian estimations of DSGE models.26 Table 7
reports estimation results which summarizes the means and the 5th and 95th percentiles of the
posterior distributions while the latter are drawn in Figure 6. According to this figure, prior
and posterior distributions are relatively different showing that the data were fairly informative.
Several parameters are well identified for one country but weakly for the other economy, we
decide to keep these parameters in the fit exercise after checking that their weak identification
does not affect our estimations (i.e. calibrating these parameters and re-estimating the model
provides very similar results). While our estimates of the standard parameters are in line with
the literature (see for instance Smets and Wouters (2003) and Quint and Rabanal (2014)),
several observations are worth making by commenting the mean of the posterior distribution of
structural parameters.
First regarding asymmetries in business and credit cycles between the core and the periphery,
they are mainly driven by the standard deviation of shocks which are larger in peripheral
economies. In particular, inefficiency shocks for wages and prices are more volatile in periphery
which may constitute an issue in the implementation of a single monetary policy. In the same
vein for macroprudential regulation, the presence of heterogenous financial shocks in terms of
volatility questions the perspective of a single federal macroprudential authority.
Second turning to structural parameters, we find an important difference between countries
regarding parameter θEi that determines the adjustment of employment to the demand of hours
worked: core countries observe a sluggish response of employment to the cycle while the mirror
image is seen for periphery. Still regarding the labor market, wage rigidity and indexation
parameters are also higher in core countries suggesting that core countries are farther from the
optimal allocation characterized by flexible wages and prices. However this interpretation is
nuanced by Gal´ı (2013) showing that wage rigidities can, in some particular situations, play
a stabilizing role for the economy. One of these particular situations exposed by Gal´ı (2013)
is a monetary policy weakly oriented toward inflation which can be observed when monetary
policy has hit its lower bound. In the light of this new reinterpretation that meets the current
situation of the Euro Area, wages and employment rigidities of core countries may have been
stabilizing frictions since the financial crisis episode in 2009.
Third, the results related to market integration are in line with the standard empirical
evidence. In particular, peripheral economies are more open and dependent to the core area
than the opposite, except for interbank facilities. This latter result is hard to reconcile with
the empirical evidence as, before the financial crisis, peripheral economies where net recipient
of interbank loans that fueled the property boom. This could be a limitation of the analysis
conducted here, however by summing both the net entry of corporate and interbank loans,
our model predicts that peripheral economies were net recipient of loans consistently with the
historical experience of the Euro Area.
26The posterior distribution combines the likelihood function with prior information. To calculate the posterior
distribution to evaluate the marginal likelihood of the model, the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is employed.
We compute the posterior moments of the parameters using a sufficiently large number of draws, having made
sure that the MCMC algorithm converged. To do this, a sample of 250, 000 draws was generated for four chains
through parallelization, neglecting the first 50, 000. The scale factor was set in order to deliver acceptance rates
of between 20 and 30 percent for each chain. Convergence was assessed by means of the multivariate convergence
statistics taken from Brooks and Gelman (1998). We estimate the model using the dynare package of Adjemian
et al. (2011). We provide in the online appendix the bayesian IRF of the model which are all fairly consistent
with VAR-type models evidence.
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4 The performance of Macroprudential Policy
4.1 The suboptimality of the federal solution
The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB, henceforth), as defined in the Basel III accords (2010)
and ESRB handbook (2014), is an instrument designed to contain the procyclicality of the
financial sector. It is aimed at building up a capital buffer when threats to resilience are high
or during periods of excessive credit growth and can be released when systemic risks abate.
The ESRB has selected the credit-to-gdp gap as a leading indicator to signal upcoming crises
that the CCB is meant to mitigate. A natural translation of the CCB’s objective in our setup
corresponds to the minimization of the variance of the credit-to-gdp ratio in the monetary
union:27
L = σ2L/Y + λY σ2Y + λνσ2ν , (17)
where σ2L/Y , σ
2
Y and σ
2
ν denote respectively the unconditional variance of the credit-to-gdp ratio,
output and policy tool νi,t while parameters λY and λν are weights on output and CCB. This
ad-hoc loss function L borrowed from Angelini et al. (2014) is obtained as a weighted average
of national loss functions for each area. It is defined as, L = nLc + (1− n)Lp, where for each
country the national loss is given by, Li = σ2i,L/Y + λY σ2i,Y + λνσ2i,ν . Noticeably, as our model
features an interbank market, the credit-to-gdp ratio is given by the aggregate credit supply
divided by output: ctgi,t=(L
s
i,t + (1− λ) IBsi,t)/Yi,t. As Angelini et al. (2014), we assume that
λν=0.10 and λY =0, however in a robustness section we investigate whether our results are
sensitive to this calibration.
Using the criterion (17), we are able to perform a similar exercise as Angelini et al. (2014)
by ranking macroprudential policies selecting CCB rule’s coefficients [ρυc ,ρ
υ
p ,φc,φp] that deliver
the smallest loss. We search over a four-dimensional grid over parameters ranges [0,1) for
ρυi and [0,5] for φi. As a benchmark for comparing our scenarios for CCB implementation,
we consider the optimal monetary policy situation characterized by the optimized Taylor rule
that maximizes the welfare of households living in the monetary union. Put differently, the
interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy follows a Stackelberg game where
monetary policy is leader by removing nominal inefficiencies in the Euro area through the
refinancing rate, followed afterward by macroprudential policy which dampens financial cycles.
Optimal monetary policy is based on a second order approximation to equilibrium conditions
of the model as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) using estimated parameters of Table 7.28
Optimal weights in the Taylor rule are respectively ρ=0.99, φpi=4.38, φ∆y=0.5.
Finally, the minimization of the variance of the credit-to-GDP gap can be re-interpreted
through an allocation problem for authorities. Entrepreneurs’ distorted beliefs generate over-
borrowing decisions which inefficiently amplify the cycle. By so, entrepreneurs do not internalize
their contribution to the financial amplification. Authorities thus implement a capital require-
ment policy which can be seen as a Pigouvian tax on banks aiming at internalizing the increase of
27We are aware that the minimization of a loss function rather than a micro-founded welfare criterion is a
limitation of our analysis. However, it is also well-known that the usual welfare criterion weakly portrays the trade-
off faced by macroprudential authorities between macroeconomic and financial stabilization. A macroprudential
policy maximizing the welfare index reduces inflation to the detriment of the financial system which experiences
higher volatilities for credit supply and spreads. In response, Woodford (2012) employs an ad hoc loss function
that fairly portrays the objective of macroprudential policy. Most of the literature follows Woodford’s approach,
such as Darracq-Parie`s et al. (2011) and Angelini et al. (2014).
28In the quantitative simulation, we first search for weights attached to inflation φpi, GDP growth φ∆y and the
smoothing degree ρ in the Taylor rule that gives the highest unconditional welfare of households from Equation 18.
Based on the grid search by 0.01 unit, we limit our attention to policy coefficients in the interval (1, 5] for φpi,
[0, 0.5] for φ∆y (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2007), and in the interval [0, 0.99] for ρ to speed up optimization
routines. We take into account the zero-lower bound by adding a penalty term in the welfare index associated
to the variance of the nominal interest rate following the calibration of Woodford (2003).
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the social cost through higher lending rates to entrepreneurs.29 Thus the financial amplification
is measured here through the variance of the credit-to-GDP ratio.
We evaluate the stabilization performance of each macroprudential policy scheme by min-
imizing the second order loss function defined in Equation 17 subject to linear equilibrium
conditions of the estimated model.
Table 2
Loss-based ranking of different macroprudential policy implementation schemes
Optimal Stances Loss
Scheme ρυc φc ρ
υ
p φp L Lc Lp
Loan Supply Targeting
1.a Union-wide loan supply 0.59 5.2 0.28 4.6 5.4076 3.9097 7.4761
1.b National loan supply 0.96 2.2 0.91 1.97 0.0071 0.0078 0.0062
Loan Demand Targeting
2.a Union-wide loan demand 0.46 2.64 0.49 1.25 5.4787 3.9577 7.5791
2.b National loan demand 0.16 2.55 0.96 2.79 0.67336 0.46427 0.9621
Capital Inflows Targeting
3. Capital Inflows 0.53 2.36 0.15 0.57 19.7407 13.5852 28.241
Table 2 reports the policy stance and the stabilizing performances for each implementation
scheme. The optimal stabilization of the financial system critically depends on the target
selected by macroprudential authorities. Unsurprisingly, we observe a clear ranking favoring
operational instruments reacting to national loan developments (schemes 1.b and 2.b) that
outperforms solutions based on federal loan developments (schemes 1.a and 2.a).
A natural question is thus to determine the degree of mutual financial cross-border lending
flows that should be observed to affect this main conclusion. Indeed, as underlined by Cecchetti
and Tucker (2016) and Beck et al. (2016) a higher banking integration should require a common
prudential standard (here, the targeting rule) applied appropriately to all parts of the financial
system. As a consequence, the efficiency of federal targeting rules (i.e. schemes 1.a and 2.a) is
expected to increase with the share of cross-border loans while national adjusted should be less
efficient. To investigate this question, Figure 3 reports minimized loss functions for different
levels of cross-border loans. Three component are presented related to an increase in total
(namely the sum of corporate and interbank) cross-border loans in the left panel, in corporate
loans only in the center panel and in interbank loans only in the right panel.
We can draw three main conclusions from Figure 3. First, the interest of conducting federal
based definition of the credit-to-gdp ratio unsurprisingly increases with the size of cross-border
flows. As reported in the first panel, the relative interest of implementing a national adjusted
rule (such as 1.b and 2.b) is magnified with respect to the federal adjusted rule for lower values
of αLi and α
IB
i . However for values of these parameters higher than 25%, the gap in the loss
function values tends to decrease significantly. Nevertheless, macroprudential rules based on a
federal definition of the credit to GDP ratio becomes only interesting for a mutual cross-border
lending openness lying around 45%. This figure is rather high with respect to the current value
of cross-border lending, which makes this solution not optimal for the moment.
Second, this policy outcome regarding the reduction in the loss function under a federal
definition of the credit-to-gdp ratio is mainly driven by the mutual openness of the corporate
credit markets. As reported in the center and right panels, interbank cross-border lending credit
has no noticeable impact on the relative ranking of policy solutions, while the integration of
the corporate loan segment determines the slope of the decrease in the loss function under the
federal solution.
29We refer to Jeanne and Korinek (2013) for the implementation of macroprudential measures through a social
planner problem.
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Note: for each value of the share of foreign loans in the portfolio of entrepreneurs (denoted αLi ) and banks (denoted α
IB
i ),
we compute the optimal macroprudential policy for four different schemes. The loss function is an average between core
and periphery detailed in Equation 17. Capital inflows-adjusted policy is not reported as its loss is too high compared to
alternative schemes.
Figure 3: The role of cross-border banking in the scheme ranking.
Third, even if banking integration clearly enhances the stabilization performances of federal-
adjusted schemes, a macroprudential solution targeting the national credit supply remains re-
markably efficient with a global banking system. For the all spectrum of values of αLi and
αIBi displayed in panels of Figure 3, CCB reaction to a national definition of the credit-to-gdp
ratio determines the lowest value for the loss function. Thus, our experiments suggest that
even if cross-border linkages are high enough to justify the implementation of a federal adjusted
solution, the reaction to national lending conditions remains optimal.
4.2 Contrasting national solutions
As underlined in Table 2 our numerical results suggest that the best outcome for the loss func-
tion value is obtained when macroprudential policy targets the national supply of loans instead
of the national demand for loans (i.e., accounts for the national and foreign nature of loans
contracted in the economy). The interest of targeting loan supply is easily understandable, as
the transmission channel of macroprudential policy directly impacts the marginal cost of loan
production and, by so, financial intermediaries. If macroprudential policy targets loan demand,
this direct channel is dampened, which leads to a lower reduction of the loss function. Na-
tional macroprudential policies reacting to federal averages do not target the origin of financial
imbalances as regional divergences in credit cycles are too important to have a single federal
target. The solution focusing on cross-border lending developments (3), is clearly dominated by
all the other implementation schemes: in this case, the loss function reaches its highest value,
revealing that targeting external imbalances is not appropriate as it does not take into account
the financial roots of the problem.
To understand these results we simulate the dynamic responses to a negative productivity
shock in core countries and a negative net wealth shock in peripheral economies.30 We concen-
trate on these two shocks as they are leading drivers of the loan-to-gdp ratio that authorities
aim at stabilizing through capital buffer measures.
First, Figure 4 reports the IRFs after a negative productivity shock for each CCB rule with
30As underlined by Angelini et al. (2014), supply shocks may dominate in normal times, while financial shocks
are important in exceptional times.
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Figure 4: System response to an estimated negative productivity shock in core countries ηAc,t
measured in percentage deviations from steady state under different macroprudential policy
rules (domestic or union-wide supply/demand/inflows targeting).
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respect to the optimal monetary policy situation. Under the benchmark of an optimal monetary
policy (dashed lines), a negative home productivity shock depresses investment and activity and
implies inefficient fluctuations in the credit-to-gdp ratio. This shock translates to the peripheral
region through trade channels, cross-border lending, monetary policy reaction and shock corre-
lation. The introduction of national macroprudential measures has a clear stabilizing effect for
business cycles of the monetary union. The release of the buffer eases the bank capital constraint
which in turn lowers credit spreads and investment fluctuations. However, the targeting regime
determining the CCB rate critically affects the outcome the economy that does not experience
the shock and explains the effectiveness of national credit targeting regimes over federal ones.
In a federal targeting regime (1.a and 2.a), both countries react to a common average credit-to-
gdp ratio which leads the foreign country to react procyclically to foreign shocks. In addition,
we do not find clear differences between targeting national credit demand or supply. Finally
CCB rates adjusted to capital inflows fail at providing macroeconomic stability in particular for
the peripheral country. The shock in the core country generates a re-allocation of credit from
core to peripheral economies and authorities in peripheral economies procyclically tighten the
capital constraint which inefficiently amplifies the crisis.
Second, Figure 5 depicts the IRFs after a negative stock market shock in peripheral economies.
Under the optimal monetary policy benchmark (dashed lines), this shock deteriorates the bor-
rowing conditions of entrepreneurs, thus incurring a large decline in output and investment
through the external finance premium channel. Consequently, the credit-to-gdp gap experi-
ences a large decline inefficiently driven by the biased expectations of entrepreneurs. Our main
results regarding the implementation of macroprudential measures are similar to the produc-
tivity shock. National credit targeting is preferred to a federal one as the latter exacerbates
fluctuations for the country that does not experience the shock, creating a spillover effect.
The same procyclical mechanism is observed for the capital inflows targeting scheme. Finally,
targeting the demand or supply of credit provides very similar responses.
Table 3
Macroeconomic performances of different implementation schemes in comparison to the optimal policy bench-
mark
Standard deviations (%) Correlation
Core Periphery
Scheme yˆc,t lˆ
s
c,t ibˆc,t sˆ
L
c,t yˆp,t lˆ
s
p,t ibˆp,t sˆ
L
c,t corr(yˆc,t, yˆp,t)
Monetary Policy Only
Benchmark 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0.15
Loan Supply Targeting
1.a Union-wide loan supply 91.57 91.95 75.11 127.47 103.88 113.45 73.86 105.96 0.15
1.b National loan supply 79.67 76.60 74.48 130.46 95.06 86.19 73.93 120.19 0.46
Loan Demand Targeting
2.a Union-wide loan demand 91.58 92.06 75.1 127.29 103.79 112.92 73.96 105.58 0.16
2.b National loan demand 82.89 92.94 71.73 137.08 76.24 63.42 76.19 116.41 0.44
Capital Inflows Targeting
3 Capital Inflows 93.42 138.3 73.27 156.67 96.33 79.92 88.94 90.46 0.37
Accounting for all shocks of the model, Table 3 reports the standard deviation of activity,
corporate and interbank loans and interest rate spread under alternative policy schemes. We
contrast our results with respect to the optimal monetary policy (without prudential regulation)
to measure how the conduct of macroprudential measures have decreased/increased the standard
deviation of endogenous variables for each country. This exercise measures how the stabilizing
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Figure 5: System response to an estimated negative firms net wealth shock in peripheral coun-
tries ηNp,t measured in percentage deviations from steady state under different CCB regulation
schemes (domestic or union-wide supply/demand/inflows targeting).
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gains are distributed between countries. We also report business cycle synchronization statistics,
as measured by the correlation of output between economies, to evaluate whether the scheme
is able to smooth the heterogeneity between Euro Area participants.
Overall, the highest gains can be obtained by adopting macroprudential policy measures re-
acting to national developments in the credit-to-gdp ratio. The reaction of the macroprudential
instrument to other measures of the credit-to-gdp ratio (based on either loan demand or federal
averages) leads to less reduction in the standard deviation of these aggregates. However, the
implementation of macroprudential policy is not a free lunch since the building up of a capi-
tal buffer mechanically increases the volatility of the spread when stabilizing the debt-to-GDP
ratio.31
In addition, we observe a natural link between loan-to-GDP stabilization and business cycle
synchronization, showing that the implementation of national-adjusted macroprudential poli-
cies smooths the heterogeneity across regions. Such a result is interesting for monetary policy
makers, as the effectiveness of a single monetary policy critically depends on business cycle syn-
chronization between monetary union participants. Thus the enhanced cycle synchronization
partially solves the Euro Area’s problem of a “one-size-fits-all” monetary policy.
Contrasting the national demand and national supply targeting solutions, we find that their
effectiveness are clearly different according to the country considered. As an example, the
supply side oriented policy fits the situation of core economies, while the one oriented towards
the demand of credit meets the situation of peripheral economies in terms of macroeconomic
stabilization. Core countries should thus focus on the stabilization of its banks while peripheral
economies should stabilize its borrowers. Having asymmetric targets between regions of the
Eurozone could be an interesting perspective to implement stabilization policies.
Finally the capital inflows targeting solution fits well peripheral economies that were net
recipient of foreign claims before the 2009 crisis. However, this policy is harmful for core
countries, affected by an increase in the volatility of loans and of the credit spread. Over
the sample time period, core countries were net exporter of loans by fueling property booms
in peripheral economies through interbank lending, this capital outflow involves an inefficient
and durable reduction of the CCB rate enhancing the volatility of credit domestically. While
capital controls appears to be a promising tool for Periphery, it is clearly unsuited to countries
experiencing capital outflows.
5 Additional sensitivity analysis
This section assesses the robustness of our results with respect to some key parameters of the
model and to the nature of shocks encountered in the economy.
5.1 Loss function calibration
First, Table 4 reports the sensitivity analysis of the main results to the calibrated value of
some underlying parameters. The first experiments focus on the weight parameters of the loss
function of macroprudential authorities. As reported, the ranking of policies remain unaffected
by the value of these parameters. An increase in the policymakers preferences for output
(denoted λy) or the penalization of the variance of capital requirements (denoted λν) increases
the loss. Turning to structural parameters (namely the degree of substitutability between
different varieties of loans ν and n the share of core countries in the monetary union) the
sensitivity analysis does not alter the ranking of macroprudential decisions. As observed, an
increase in the size of the core countries’ group has opposite results on the value of the loss,
depending on the dimension of the credit-to-gdp ratio that is taken into account in the reaction
31The variability of the lending spread is a leading indicator of financial distress, Woodford (2012) sets its
stabilization as an objective for monetary policy making with financial frictions.
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Table 4
Sensitivity analysis of scheme ranking to different calibrated parameters
Euro area loss L
1.a 1.b 2.a 2.b 3
Loss output stabilization λy = 0 5.4076 0.0071 5.4787 0.67336 19.7407
λy = 5 6.0138 0.4063 5.9196 1.0906 16.7659
λy = 10 6.5325 0.8036 6.5119 1.5042 20.8989
Loss policy instrument λν = 0 5.4063 0.0004 5.5147 0.66152 19.9706
λν = 5 5.7099 0.28443 5.7186 0.97562 20.1045
λν = 10 5.9328 0.53581 5.9252 1.1936 20.4273
Loan substitutability ν, ξ = 0 5.5082 0.0072 5.4190 0.67025 19.7962
ν, ξ = 5 5.5206 0.0068 5.5392 0.6914 20.2309
ν, ξ = 10 5.5372 0.0067 5.5298 0.7056 20.9558
Share of core countries n = 0.4 5.5641 0.0069 5.5485 0.0868 19.0729
n = 0.5 5.6804 0.0069 5.7378 0.3138 19.7849
n = 0.6 5.4134 0.0071 5.4053 0.78181 20.2335
Flexible interest rates θLi = 0 5.9139 0.0058 5.8096 0.65304 17.8474
θDi = 0 5.8987 0.0074 5.8685 0.66579 16.6966
θLi = θ
D
i = 0 5.9067 0.0059 5.8446 0.66382 21.3504
Note: λy and λν denote respectively weights on output and policy tool volatities in the macroprudential loss function, ν
is the substitution degree between home and foreign credit varieties and n denotes the share of core countries in terms of
real GDP in the euro area. Losses are evaluated using the average of core and peripheral countries volatilities.
of macroprudential policy. The loss decreases for schemes based on a reaction to national loan
developments while it increases when the macroprudential instrument reacts to the federal value
of the ratio. However, the gap between the loss values remain so high that the ranking between
national and federal solutions is left unaffected. Regarding the nominal rigidities on interest
rates, thus reflecting the imperfect pass-through of both monetary and macroprudential policies,
disabling this nominal friction does not affect the ranking too.
5.2 Nature of shocks
Second, Table 5 reports the sensitivity analysis of the main results to the nature of shocks en-
countered in the economy. We distinguish between supply (productivity shocks), demand (gath-
ering public spending shocks, preference shocks and investment shocks) and financial shocks
(gathering shocks on the collateral of corporate lending, on riskiness of investment projects
and cost push shocks on deposit). As underlined by Angelini et al. (2014), supply and demand
shocks may dominate in normal times, while financial shocks are important in exceptional times.
For each shock, we contrast the consequences of adopting one of the macroprudential scheme
adopted for the definition of the credit-to-gdp ratio (1a to 3). As observed, the relative ranking
of the policy scheme is not altered by the nature of shocks encountered in the economy, as the
solution based upon the reaction of authorities to the fluctuations in the national loan supply
to GDP dominates all the other possibilities. However, the value of the loss fluctuates and it is
higher for financial shocks. Furthermore, a closer look at the macroprudential parameters shows
that the nature of the shock affects the contemporaneous policy stance of regional authorities.
As observed, for real shocks, the contemporaneous reaction of core countries authorities tends
to be higher for supply shocks while peripheral countries are more reactive for demand shocks.
This latter feature is also observed for exceptional times.
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Table 5
Robustness check: optimal monetary and macroprudential Policies conditional on shocks
Monetary Macroprudential Loss
Policy Policy Union Core Periph
Scheme ρ φpi φ∆y ρυc φc ρ
υ
p φp Lu Lc Lp
Supply Shocks
1.a Union-wide loan supply 0.94 5 0.5 0.82 0.30 0.41 3.86 1.3139 0.95417 1.8107
1.b National loan supply 0.94 5 0.5 0.95 2.72 0.86 2.58 0.0027 0.0041 0.0007
2.a Union-wide loan demand 0.94 5 0.5 0.90 3.54 0.39 0.50 1.3189 0.95679 1.819
2.b National loan demand 0.94 5 0.5 0.46 2.49 0.48 2.46 0.065797 0.04746 0.091119
3 Capital Inflows 0.94 5 0.5 0.81 3.63 0.43 0.98 1.9538 1.5535 2.5065
Demand Shocks
1.a Union-wide loan supply 0.99 1 0.5 0.66 3.07 0.62 2.16 0.20432 0.14956 0.27993
1.b National loan supply 0.99 1 0.5 0.94 2.52 0.64 2.52 0.0035 0.0039 0.0029
2.a Union-wide loan demand 0.99 1 0.5 0.58 2.61 0.39 2.37 0.2051 0.1504 0.2806
2.b National loan demand 0.99 1 0.5 0.05 2.35 0.80 2.69 0.7980 0.5139 1.1903
3 Capital Inflows 0.99 1 0.5 0.76 3.68 0.08 0.41 12.7015 11.5068 14.3513
Financial Shocks
1.a Union-wide loan supply 0 1.48 0.5 0.15 1.60 0.24 3.35 0.5895 0.4308 0.8086
1.b National loan supply 0 1.48 0.5 0.92 2.21 0.94 1.66 0.0023 0.0014 0.0035
2.a Union-wide loan demand 0 1.48 0.5 0.06 1.94 0.26 3.58 0.5900 0.4301 0.8107
2.b National loan demand 0 1.48 0.5 0.98 1.72 0.85 1.37 0.0054 0.0038 0.0077
3 Capital Inflows 0 1.48 0.5 0.30 0.47 0.96 4.63 2.6168 2.1119 3.3141
Note: each group of shocks is composed of core and peripheral shocks and their associated cross-correlation. Supply shocks
group gathers productivity shocks ηAi,t; Demand shocks group gathers spending η
G
i,t, preferences η
U
i,t and investment η
I
i,t;
Financial shocks gathers collateral crunch ηNi,t, riskiness η
Q
i,t and deposit cost-push η
D
i,t innovations.
5.3 Structural financial asymmetries
Table 6
Sensitivity analysis of scheme ranking to financial structural asymmetries
Euro area loss L
1.a 1.b 2.a 2.b 3
Benchmark 5.4076 0.0071 5.4787 0.67336 19.7407
Firms rate of default 1− η¯Ep = 0.0125 6.6312 0.0078 6.6535 0.58638 22.6661
Share of illiquid banks λp = 0.48 6.0702 0.0078 6.3512 1.9242 21.7665
Corporate net wealth-to-assets ratio N¯p/K¯p = 0.2 7.4030 0.0070 7.3528 0.55023 22.8376
Bank leverage ratio BKc/A¯c = 0.06 6.5421 0.0163 6.5513 0.64037 19.651
Third, we investigate whether structural asymmetries affect the ranking of the model, results
are reported in Table 6. In the benchmark setup developed in the paper, we assumed that most
of the endogenous variables in the deterministic steady state were symmetric between countries.
However this assumption is questionable, in particular regarding the asymmetries in the financial
sector which may be an important feature for macroprudential policymaking. As a first exercise,
we examine whether the symmetry assumption on the default rate of entrepreneurs matters for
the scheme ranking. Since we cannot observe the default rate of entrepreneurs, we use as a proxy
the share of non-performing loans in the balance sheet of banks in BankScope database. We
find that the share of non-performing loans is on average twice higher in Periphery and calibrate
the defaulting share of entrepreneurs accordingly. We find that this structural asymmetry does
not affect the ranking, however we observe a small reduction of the gap between the demand-
adjusted and the supply-adjusted macroprudential policy. We also investigate the implications of
cross-country heterogeneity in the share of illiquid banks operating in the interbank market. We
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proxy this parameter through the number of banks borrowing on the unsecured money market
provided by Garcia-de Andoain et al. (2014). We find that on average the share of banks
borrowing on the interbank market is 25% higher in Periphery, we calibrate λP accordingly
in our model. The new ranking obtained from the new set of simulations show no important
difference, except for the national demand solution which becomes less efficient in stabilizing the
credit-to-gdp ratio. We also investigate the implication of asymmetric steady state leverages of
firms and of banks between countries. Core countries observed a lower net-worth-to-asset ratio
than Peripheral economies for firms,32 we take this feature into account by calibrating N¯p/K¯p
at 20% as in Italy. For banks, we use the ECB’s Risk Assessment Indicators (RAI) and find
that Core banks are less capitalized on average, in particular because of Belgium, Germany and
Netherlands’s low equity to assets ratios. We calibrate the leverage ratio of core banks to 6%
to incorporate this structural asymmetry and run the simulations. We observe no clear ranking
change under these two asymmetries. Overall, these robustness exercises confirm that these
structural aspects does not affect the ranking as second order statistics minimized in the loss
function are rather independent of structural asymmetries.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that international lending flows have mixed effects on the optimal conduct of
macroprudential policy in the Eurozone. Contrasting alternative rules for countercyclical cap-
ital buffers, our results suggest that targeting a national credit-to-gdp ratio should be favored
to federal averages as this rule induces better stabilizing performances in terms of output and
loan volatility. The important divergences in credit cycles between core and peripheral coun-
tries reported in the data require a national orientation of macroprudential policy tailored to
domestic financial developments. Our results have also underlined the reduced interest of lifting
up macroprudential policymaking to the supra-national level. Indeed, national capital buffers
reacting to the union-wide loan-to-GDP ratio lead to the same stabilization results than the one
obtained under the national reaction when mutual cross-border lending reaches 45%. However,
even if cross-border linkages are high enough to justify the implementation of a federal adjusted
solution, the reaction to national lending conditions remarkably remains optimal. In addition,
we find that adjusting the macroprudential instrument to capital inflows is a promising tool for
countries experiencing loans inflows.
The analysis of cross-border lending on the conduct of macroprudential policy is a burgeon-
ing research area. In this paper we focused on countercyclical capital buffers, and an interesting
question for future research is to evaluate how this result favoring self-oriented macropruden-
tial measures may be affected by the choice of alternative macroprudential instruments. The
construction of an original welfare index, that features a trade-off between macroeconomic and
financial stability, could be a next step of research. Finally, the analysis of the CCB rate through
a Ramsey allocation problem could also be part of a future research agenda.
A Data sources
Gross domestic product: millions of national currency, current prices, quarterly levels, sea-
sonally adjusted - sources Eurostat. Private final consumption expenditure: millions of
national currency, current prices, quarterly levels, seasonally adjusted - sources Eurostat. Gross
fixed capital formation: millions of national currency, current prices, quarterly levels, sea-
sonally adjusted - sources Eurostat. GDP deflator: Deseasonalized using a multiplicative
32There is a clear asymmetry between Core and Peripheral countries in terms of debt-to-financial assets ratios.
For instance, France had a ratio of 40%, Germany 60% and Netherlands 60% while Italy had 80% and Spain
60%.
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decomposition - sources Eurostat. Loans to Non-Financial corporations: Index of No-
tional Stocks, Total maturity, Euro area (changing composition) counterpart, Deseasonalized
using a multiplicative decomposition, monthly data (aggregated to get quarterly data) - sources
ECB (internal backcasted series). Loans to MFIs: Index of Notional Stocks, Total maturity,
Euro area (changing composition) counterpart, Deseasonalized using a multiplicative decom-
position, monthly data (aggregated to get quarterly data) - sources ECB (internal backcasted
series). Borrowing cost: monthly (taken in average to get quarterly data), Credit and other
institutions (MFI except MMFs and central banks); Loans up to 1 year; BS counterpart sector:
Non-Financial corporations (S.11); Outstanding amount - sources ECB (internal backcasted se-
ries). Deposit rate: monthly (taken in average to get quarterly data), Firms and Households;
- sources ECB (internal backcasted series). Money market rates: money market interest
rates, one year maturity, quarterly data - sources Eurostat.
B The non-banking part of the model
We extend the model of Poutineau and Vermandel (2015) to account for the conduct of macro-
prudential policy in an heterogenous monetary union such as the Euro Area. Our model de-
scribes a monetary union made of two asymmetric countries i ∈ {c, p} (where c is for core and
p for periphery). Each part i of the monetary union is of a relative size ni.
33 As shown in Fig-
ure 2, each country is populated by consumers, intermediate and final producers, entrepreneurs,
capital suppliers and a banking system. Regarding the conduct of macroeconomic policy, we
assume national fiscal authorities and a common central bank. The implementation of the
macroprudential policy is left open, and will be discussed below in another section. Our model
is confronted to the data using Bayesian econometrics and it encompasses several sources of
rigidities to enhance its empirical relevance. The set of real rigidities accounts for consumption
habits, investment adjustment costs and loan demand habits. Regarding nominal rigidities, we
account for stickiness in final goods prices and loan interest rates.
B.1 Households and labor unions
The preferences of the jth household are given by:
Et
∑∞
s=0
βτ exp(εUi,t+s)
(
log
(
Ci,t+s − hCi Ci,t−1+s
)− χi
(1 + σHi )
H
1+σHi
i,t+s
)
, (18)
where Et denotes the expectation operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, parameter σHi > 0
shapes the utility function of the jth household associated to hours worked Hi,t. The consump-
tion index Ci,t is subject to external habits with degree h
C
i ∈ [0; 1) with Ci,t−1 the aggregate
lagged consumption, while χi > 0 is a shift parameter allowing us to pin down the steady state
amount of hours worked. The discount factor is affected by a time-preference shock εUi,t following
an AR(1) stochastic process that exogenously changes the household’s intertemporal allocation
of consumption over the cycle.
Household jth period budget constraint is given by:
whi,tHi,t +D
d
i,t−1
(
1 +RDi,t−1
)
(1 + piCi,t)
+ Πi,t = Ci,t +D
d
i,t + ti,t + pi,tAC
D
i,t. (19)
The income of the representative household is made of labor income with the desired real wage
whi,t,
34 interest payments for deposit services Ddi,t and real earnings Πi,t from shareholdings of
33Normalizing the size of the monetary union to unity, the relative size of the core are is n and the relative size
of the peripheral area is 1− n.
34As explained below, the desired wage is negotiated by a trade union.
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firms and unions. The interest rate is deflated by the consumer price inflation rate 1+piCi,t =
PCi,t/P
C
i,t−1. The representative household spends this income on consumption, deposits and tax
payments for a real amount of ti,t. Finally, we assume that the household has to pay quadratic
adjustment costs to buy new deposits,35 these costs are paid in terms home goods with relative
price pi,t = Pi,t/P
C
i,t where Pi,t is the production price index of home produced goods while P
C
i,t
is the consumption price index. Households consume both home and foreign goods and their
corresponding consumption basket follows a standard CES function:
Ci,t =
((
1− αCi
)1/µ
C
(µ−1)/µ
hi,t +
(
αCi
)1/µ
C
(µ−1)/µ
fi,t
)µ/(µ−1)
, (20)
where parameter µ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign final goods
and αCi ∈ [0, 1/2] measures the fraction of goods bought abroad. The corresponding price index
is, PCi,t = (
(
1− αCi
)
P 1−µh,t + α
C
i P
1−µ
f,t )
1/(1−µ).
Households delegate the wage negotiation process to unions. Households provide differenti-
ated labor types, sold by labor unions to perfectly competitive labor packers who assemble them
in a CES aggregator and sell the homogenous labor to intermediate firms.36 Unions negotiate
the real margin between the real desired wage of households whi,t and the real marginal product
of labor Wi,t/P
C
i,t. Using a Calvo wage nominal rigidity device, each period a random fraction
θWi of unions is unable to re-negotiate a new wage. Assuming that the trade union is able to
modify its wage with a probability 1−θWi , the jth union chooses the nominal optimal wage W ∗i,t
to maximize its expected sum of profits:
Et
∑∞
s=0
(
θWi
)s
Λi,t+s
[
W ∗i,t
PCi,t+τ
s∏
k=1
(
1 + piCi,t+k−1
)ξWi − exp(εWi,t+s)whi,t+s
]
Hi,t+s, (21)
where Λi,t+τ is household’s stochastic discount factor, ε
W
i,t is an ad-hoc wage-push shock to the
real wage equation following an AR(1) process which captures exogenous fluctuations in the
wage margin negotiated by unions and affects in turn the productivity of the economy.
B.2 Firms
Intermediate firms produce differentiated goods, decide on labor and capital inputs on a perfectly
competitive inputs market and set prices according to the Calvo model. The ith firm has the
following Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yi,t = exp(ε
A
i,t)
(
Kui,t
)α (
Hdi,t
)1−α
, (22)
where Yi,t is the standard production function that combines (utilized) physical capital K
u
i,t,
labor demand Hdi,t to household and (exogenous) technology ε
A
i,t. Intermediate firms solve a
two-stage problem. In the first stage, taking the real input prices wi,t and zi,t as given, firms
rent inputs Hdi,t and K
u
i,t in a perfectly competitive factor market in order to minimize costs
subject to the production constraint (22) to determine the real marginal cost mci,t.
In the second-stage, the intermediate firm i sets prices according to a Calvo mechanism. Each
period firm i is not allowed to re-optimize its price with probability θPi but price increases by
35This cost is almost neutral on the dynamic of the model and is necessary to remove an unit root component
which is standardly induced by the international nature of our model. See Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003)
for an extensive discussion and solutions regarding this issue. The functional form we choose is: ACDi,t (j) =
0.5χD(D
d
i,t (j)− D¯i)2/D¯i, where D¯i is the steady state level of deposits and χD > 0 is the cost parameter.
36Labor packers are perfectly competitive and maximize profits, Wi,tH
d
i,t−G(Wi,t (j)Hi,t (j)), under their pack-
ing technology constraint, Hi,t = [(1/ni)
1/W G(Hi,t (j)(W−1)/W )]W /(W−1). Here, Wi,t is the production price,
Hdi,t is the labor demand and W is a substitution parameter. The first order condition which determines the opti-
mal demand for the jth labor type is, Hi,t (j) = (1/ni)(Wi,t(j)/Wi,t)
−WHdi,t, ∀j. Thus the aggregate wage index
of all labor types in the economy emerges from the zero-profit condition: Wi,t = [(1/ni)G(Wi,t (j)1−W )]1/(1−W ).
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ξPi ∈ [0; 1) with respect to the previous period’s rate of price inflation, Pi,t = (1+pii,t−1)ξ
P
i Pi,t−1.
The ith firm allowed to modify its selling price with a probability 1−θPi chooses P ∗i,t to maximize
its discounted sum of profits:
Et
∑∞
s=0
(
θPi
)s
Λi,t+s
[
P ∗i,t
PCi,t+s
s∏
k=1
(1 + pii,t+k−1)ξ
P
i − exp(εPi,t+s)mci,t+s
]
Yi,t+s, (23)
where εPi,t is an ad-hoc cost-push shock to the inflation equation following an AR(1) process
which captures exogenous inflation pressures.
Once goods are produced and prices are set, final firms act as goods packers: they combine
differentiated goods to produce the homogenous final good sold mainly to households.37
B.3 Entrepreneurs
The capital required by the intermediate firm in the production process is financed by an
entrepreneur that belongs to the same business unit i. The balance sheet of the ith entrepreneur
is given by:
qi,tKi,t = L
H
i,t +Ni,t. (24)
Defining Qi,tKi,t as the amount of capital to be financed by entrepreneur i, qi,t = Qi,t/P
C
i,t is the
real shadow value of capital goods. This quantity qi,tKi,t is financed by the entrepreneur through
two means: its net wealth Ni,t and the real amount borrowed from the banking system, L
H
i,t+1.
Formally, loan demands are subject to external habits as follows: LHi,t = L
d
i,t − hLi (Ldi,t−1 − L¯di )
with the habit degree hLi ∈ [0, 1), Ldi,t−1 the aggregate average level of loans of the previous
period and L¯di the steady state stock of loans.
38 Empirically, firms and banks operating in the
Euro Area choose longer debt maturities than the standard one-period contract usually used in
real business cycle models. Then the term hLi L
d
i,t−1 allows for slow adjustment over time of the
balance sheet constraint, to capture the idea that in practice borrowers do not readjust their
outstanding amount of loans every quarter. This approach of introducing slow adjustment of
credit is close to Iacoviello (2015), employed here in a context of a financial accelerator model.
During phases of recession characterized by asset price collapses of qi,t, this friction prevents the
total stock of loans to fall at the same rate as the price of financial assets, thus making credit
less procyclical consistently with empirical evidence. Since these habits don’t directly affect the
first order condition of the entrepreneur (as the overall problem of the entrepreneur can be
expressed in terms of physical capital directly), their implications on entrepreneurs’ profits is
rather minor but large for financial intermediary facing a persistent demand for loans.
To introduce corporate cross-border lending, we follow Poutineau and Vermandel (2015) and
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015) by adopting a CES function that bundles domestic and foreign
37Goods packers are perfectly competitive and maximize profits, Pi,tY
d
i,t −G(Pi,t (i)Yi,t (i)), under their pack-
ing technology constraint, Y di,t = [(1/ni)
1/P G(Yi,t (i)(P−1)/P )]P /(P−1). Here, Pi,t is the production price,
Y di,t is the aggregate demand (or the resource constraint) and P is a substitution parameter. The first or-
der condition which determines the optimal demand for the ith good is, Yi,t (i) = (1/ni)(Pi,t(i)/Pi,t)
−P Y di,t,
∀i. Thus the aggregate price index of all varieties in the economy emerges from the zero-profit condition:
Pi,t = [(1/ni)G(Pi,t (i)1−P )]1/(1−P ).
38In the estimation exercise, we use the total stock of loans, they are of different maturities implying a strong
autocorrelation. Simply by introducing loan demand habits, taking into account the high autocorrelation of loans
becomes tractable easily and does not change the steady state of the model. For instance in 1999, loans with a
maturity above one year represented 64% of the outstanding stock of loans in the Eurosystem.
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loans offered by banks operating in the monetary union:39
Ldi,t =
((
1− αLi
)1/υ (
Ldhi,t
)(υ−1)/υ
+
(
αLi
)1/υ (
Ldfi,t
)(υ−1)/υ)υ/(υ−1)
. (25)
Here, parameter υ ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign interbank
funds, αLi ∈ [0, 1/2] represents the percentage of cross-border interbank loan flows in the mon-
etary union and Ldhi,t (resp. L
d
fi,t) the amount of domestic (resp. foreign) loans demanded by
borrowing entrepreneurs living in country i. As a consequence, the borrowing cost is a CES
aggregate of home and foreign credit rates defined as: 1+PLi,t = ((1−αLi )(1 +RLh,t)1−υ +αLi (1 +
RLf,t)
1−υ)1/(1−υ).
Regarding financial frictions, we reinterpret the financial accelerator a` la Bernanke et al.
(1999) from a banking perspective in order to have state-contingent lending rates needed to
introduce macroprudential measures.40 To do so, we follow the modelling device of Poutineau
and Vermandel (2015) that provides a micro-foundation for the financial accelerator mechanism
relying on biased expectations of entrepreneurs instead of a standard moral hazard problem.
The investment projects undertaken by the entrepreneur are risky and differ with respect to
their individual returns. To model individual riskiness, we borrow from Bernanke et al. (1999)
and assume that each project has an individual return equal to ω
(
1 +Rki,t
)
, i.e. that the
aggregate return of investment projects in the economy 1 +Rki,t is multiplied by a random value
ω. The representative entrepreneur conducts a mass ω of diversified investment projects and
the profit of the ωth investment project is given by:
ΠEi,t (ω) = ωEt
{
1 +Rki,t+1
}
qi,tKi,t (ω)−
(
1 + PLi,t
)
LHi,t (ω) , (26)
In order to acquire a loan, entrepreneurs have to engage in a financial contract before the
realization of ω.41 After engaging in the financial contract, entrepreneurs recognize ex post the
value of ωCi,t which separates the default space (ω < ω
C
i,t) from the space of gains (ω ≥ ωCi,t).
Thereby the ex post threshold separating the default space from the profitable space is computed
trough the zero profit condition on Equation 26:
ωCi,t
(
1 +Rki,t
)
qi,t−1Ki,t−1 =
(
1 + PLi,t−1
)
LHi,t−1. (27)
Following Helpman et al. (2004), we adapt the Pareto distribution to model the productivity
of firms in a financial context. Investment projects are drawn from a Pareto distribution ω ∼
P(κ) with support ω ∈ [ωmin,+∞) where κ > 1 is the shape parameter and ωmin > 0 is the
lower bound of the distribution. Given the characteristics of the distribution, it is possible to
compute the share of profitable projects, denoted ηEi,t = (ωmin/ω
C
i,t)
κ, and their aggregate value,
ω¯i,t = κ/(κ − 1)ωCi,t.42 When the entrepreneur is underwater with an investment project value
39Kollmann et al. (2011) provides a complementary way of introducing cross-border lending through global
banks. However, this approach assumes a perfect credit market intregration between Euro participants that is
not consistent with the data. Alternatively, Dedola and Lombardo (2012) introduce cross-border loans through a
portfolio problem that requires a second order approximation to the policy function, which poses an issue when
putting the model to the data.
40The pathbreaking contribution of Bernanke et al. (1999) focuses on the demand side of credit market through
a moral hazard problem but neglects its supply side and in turn the possibility to introduce macroprudential
measures that could affect the macroeconomic outcome. Their model is closed assuming that lending rates are
pre-determined.
41The individual return ω is also referred as an idiosyncratic shock in the financial accelerator literature. The
debt contract is conclude before the idiosyncratic shock is recognized which generates unexpected losses for the
entrepreneurs and lenders.
42Using the characteristics of the Pareto distribution F (ω), the distribution of stochastic investment projects ω
has a positive support, is independently distributed (across entrepreneurs and time) with unitary mean E [ω] = 1,
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below the cost of credit, she endogenously defaults on her loan and abandons her investment
project.
To introduce a financial accelerator mechanism, we assume that entrepreneurs have short
term distorted expectations regarding the aggregate profitability of their aggregate investment
projects ω¯i,t, thus creating a financial friction in the economy with dynamic properties close to
Bernanke et al. (1999). The perceived ex ante value of profitable projects ω¯i,t+1 is defined by
the CES function:43
g (ω¯i,t+1) = ω¯
1/(1−κi)
i (ω¯i,t+1)
κi/(κi−1) , (28)
where κi ∈ [0, 1) is the elasticity of the external finance premium and ω¯i is the steady state of
ω¯i,t+1. During phases of expansion characterized by high aggregate returns above the the steady
state ω¯i,t+1 > ω¯i, entrepreneurs’ forecasts regarding the aggregate profitability are optimistic
with g (ω¯i,t+1) > ω¯i,t+1. In contrast for low expected realizations of ω¯i,t+1 below its steady state,
entrepreneurs tend to hold pessimistic expectations about their returns with g (ω¯i,t+1) < ω¯i,t+1.
Finally in steady state, there is no expectation bias, g (ω¯i) = ω¯i.
44 Any shock driving financial
returns above or below the steady state will trigger an acceleration of the business cycles through
these biased expectations for κi > 0.
Aggregating all profitable investment projects (i.e. above ωCi,t) that the entrepreneur does
not abandon, it chooses a capital value of Ki,t that maximizes its profit (before the realization
of ω) defined as:
ΠEi,t = Et
{
ηEi,t+1
[
g (ω¯i,t+1)
(
1 +Rki,t+1
)
qi,tKi,t −
(
1 + PLi,t
)
LHi,t
]}
. (29)
Taking the first order condition combined with Equation 27, the financial accelerator principle
emerges through the external finance premium expression:
1 +Rki,t+1
1 + PLi,t
=
1
ω¯i
[
κ
κ− 1
(
1− Ni,t
qi,tKi,t
)]κi
. (30)
Up to a first order, rˆki,t+1 − pˆLi,t ' κi(qˆi,t + kˆi,t − nˆi,t), the spread is a positive function to the
capital-to-net wealth ratio. Under this assumption, the balance sheet of borrowers affects the
borrowing conditions and magnifies the financial cycle. The size of the accelerator is determined
by the degree of bias κi of borrowers.
Finally, the law of motion of the net wealth is given by profit obtained at the end of period
t-1:
Ni,t =
(
1− δE)ΠEi,t−1 exp(εNi,t), (31)
where δE ∈ [0, 1] is the net wealth decay that is related to the default rate of entrepreneur
(endogenously determined in steady state) and εNi,t is an AR(1) shock to the net wealth of
entrepreneurs which captures exogenous variations in stock prices and the demand for loans.
and density function f(ω). Investment projects above the cut-off value, ω > ωCi,t, have positive profits Π
E
i,t (ω) ≥ 0
which allows entrepreneurs to repay its loans to the bank. The share of profitable projects 1−F (ω) is computed
as, ηE = Pr
[
ω ≥ ωC] = ∫∞
ωC
f (ω)dω = (ωmin/ω
C)κ while the conditional expectation of ω when entrepreneur’s
project is gainful is, ηEω¯ =
∫∞
ωC
ωf (ω) dω with ω¯ = E
[
ω|ω ≥ ωC] = κ
κ−1ω
C .
43There is a rich literature providing evidence that entrepreneurs are more optimistic compared to the general
population; for some recent studies see, e.g., Landier and Thesmar (2009), Puri and Robinson (2013), Dawson
and Henley (2013).
44It is important to stress that function g (ω¯i,t+1) only affects expected returns of Et {ω¯i,t+1}, while for ex post
values (e.g., ω¯i,t and ω¯i,t−1) the entrepreneur recorgnizes the true value of her return.
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B.4 Capital goods producers
The capital producer rents and refurbishes the capital stock used by intermediate firms and
financed by the entrepreneurs on a competitive market. The law of motion of physical capital
is determined by:
Ki,t =
(
1− S((exp(εIi,t)Ii,t/Ii,t−1)
)
Ii,t + (1− δ)Ki,t−1, (32)
where εIi,t is a stochastic process which captures exogenous changes in asset price fluctuations and
the adjustment cost function taken from Smets and Wouters (2007) reads as: S(xt)=χ
I
i (xt−1)2
with χIi ≥ 0 is the adjustment cost. In addition, investment is composed of domestic and foreign
goods summarized by a CES function:
Ii,t = (
(
1− αIi
)1/µ
I
(µ−1)/µ
hi,t +
(
αIi
)1/µ
I
(µ−1)/µ
fi,t )
µ/(µ−1), (33)
where parameter µ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods in
investment and αIi measures the degree of investment diversification in the monetary union
between home and foreign countries. The corresponding price index of investment is, P Ii,t =
(
(
1− αIi
)
(Ph,t)
1−µ + αIi (Pf,t)
1−µ)1/(1−µ).
The representative capital supplier chooses Ii,t to maximize its real discounted profits:
max
{Ii,t}
Et
∑∞
s=0
Λi,t+s
(
qi,t+s
(
1− S(exp(εIi,t)Ii,t/Ii,t−1)
)− pIi,t+s) Ii,t+s, (34)
where qi,t = Qi,t/P
C
i,t stands for the real shadow value of investment goods and p
I
i,t = P
I
i,t/P
C
i,t
is the relative price of investment goods.
Finally regarding capital utilization, the optimal rate of utilization is given by:45
a′ (ui,t) = Zi,t, with a (ui,t) = Z¯ (ui,t − 1) + 0.5ψi/(1− ψi)Z¯ (ui,t − 1)2 , (35)
where ψi ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of utilization costs with respect to capital inputs. As in Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007), capital requires one period to be settled so that utilized capital is
defined as, Kui,t = ui,tKi,t−1.
B.5 Monetary and fiscal policy
National governments finance public spending by charging lump-sum taxes to households ti,t.
The total amount of taxes finance public spending without contracting public debt such that the
public budget is always balanced. As in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), the level of spending
Gi,t is exogenously determined as a constant fraction of output gY¯ exp(ε
G
i,t), where gY¯ is the fix
component and εGi,t is the time-varying component of spending that follows a standard AR(1)
shock process. Parameter g ∈ [0, 1) is the steady state spending-to-GDP ratio. It is important
to mention that we omit seigniorage revenues that could be given to fiscal authorities as their
inclusion generates an explosive path of deposits.46 This could be a limitation of our model,
however Leeper (1991) indicates seigniorage represents a small fraction of government revenues
for developed economies thus showing that its omission does not seem to be important for the
analysis conducted here.
Concerning federal monetary policy, the general expression of the interest rule implemented
by the monetary union central bank follows the linear rule:
Rt − R¯ = ρ
(
Rt−1 − R¯
)
+ (1− ρ) (φpipiCt + φ∆y (Yt − Yt−1)) + εRt , (36)
45When households do not take capital supply decisions, the optimal capital utilization is determined by,
maxui,t (Zi,tui,t − a (ui,t))Ki,t.
46This assumption is common for recent macroeconomic models as underlined by Curdia and Woodford (2011).
We refer to Gerali et al. (2010) or Adam (2011) for macro-models without seignioriage.
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where εRt is a monetary policy shock common to the monetary union members, φ
pi ≥ 1 is
the inflation target parameter, φ∆y is the GDP growth target. As monetary policy responds
to the aggregate evolution of inflation and activity in the monetary union, recall that piCt =
ncpi
C
c,t + nppi
C
p,t and Yt = ncYc,t + npYp,t.
B.6 Stochastic shock processes
To be in line with the benchmark model of Smets and Wouters (2003) for the Euro Area, all
our random processes follows an AR(1) specification. Each part of the Eurozone includes 10
country-specific shocks for s = {A,G,U, I, P,W,N,D,B,L} such that:
εsi,t = ρ
s
i ε
s
i,t−1 + η
s
i,t with η
s
i,t ∼ N(0, σsi ). (37)
Finally both part of the monetary union are affected by a common monetary policy shock
in Equation 36 defined as, εRt = ρ
RεRt−1 + ηRt with ηRt ∼ N(0, σR). Markups shocks for m =
{P,W,D} are normalized to one, as implicitly assumed in Smets and Wouters (2003), by dividing
their stochastic innovations ηmit by the elasticity of the linear New Keynesian Phillips curve, (1-
βθmi )(1-θ
m
i )/θ
m
i .
B.7 Aggregation and market clearing
The general equilibrium of the model is set as follows. After (i) aggregating all agents and
varieties in the economy, (ii) imposing market clearing for all markets, (iii) substituting the
relevant demand functions, (iv) normalizing the total size of the monetary union (nc + np = 1)
such that the size of the core area is n and the peripheral area size is 1− n, we get the general
equilibrium conditions of the model. We can express the aggregation function of variable Xt (x)
as: G (Xi,t (x)) =
∫ n
0 Xi,t (x)dx for i = c and G (Xi,t (x)) =
∫ 1
nXi,t (x)dx for i = p.
Thus, replacing the demand functions of foreign and home goods (consumption and invest-
ment), we finally obtain the home final goods market equilibrium:
Yc,t/∆
P
c,t =
(
1− αCc
) [
Pc,t/P
C
c,t
]−µ
Cc,t +
(
1− αIc
) [
Pc,t/P
I
c,t
]−µ
Ic,t
+ (1− n)/n
(
αCp
[
Pc,t/P
C
p,t
]−µ
Cp,t + α
I
p
[
Pc,t/P
I
p,t
]−µ
Ip,t
)
+ a (uc,t)Kc,t−1 + gY¯ exp(εGc,t) +AC
D
c,t ,
(38)
where ∆Pi,t = G (Pi,t (i) /Pi,t)−P denotes the price dispersion term, which is induced by the
assumed nature of price stickiness.
Concerning the corporate loan market, recall that entrepreneurs borrow to domestic and for-
eign banks with varieties b produced by liquid illiquid banks, leading to the following equilibrium
for each country:
Lsc,t/∆
L
c,t =
(
1− αLc
) [
(1 +RLc,t)/(1 + P
L
c,t)
]−ν
Lc,t
+ n/(1− n)αLp
[
(1 +RLc,t)/(1 + P
L
p,t)
]−ν
Lp,t,
(39)
where ∆Li,t is the credit rate dispersion term.
Turning to the interbank market, the perfect competition involves no interest rate dispersion
between loan varieties. It clears when the following condition between liquid banks and home
and foreign illiquid banks holds:
IBsc,t(1− λ)/λ =
(
1− αIBc
) [
(1 +RIBc,t )/(1 + P
IB
c,t )
]−ξ
IBdc,t
+ n/(1− n)αIBp
[
(1 +RIBc,t )/(1 + P
IB
p,t )
]−ξ
IBdp,t
(40)
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Table 7
Prior and Posterior distributions of structural parameters and shock processes.
Parameter Prior distributions Posterior distribution [5%:95%]
Shape[mean;std] CORE PERIPHERY EURO
shock standard deviations
σAi Productivity IG[0.10,2.00] 0.82 [0.64:1.00] 0.79 [0.43:1.11] -
σGi Government spending IG[0.10,2.00] 1.43 [1.20:1.65] 1.39 [1.15:1.63] -
σUi Preferences IG[0.10,2.00] 1.24 [0.76:1.73] 1.52 [0.98:2.06] -
σIi Investment costs IG[0.10,2.00] 2.55 [1.83:3.26] 2.57 [1.78:3.47] -
σPi Firms markup IG[0.10,2.00] 0.10 [0.06:0.14] 0.29 [0.17:0.41] -
σWi Unions markup IG[0.10,2.00] 0.45 [0.33:0.57] 0.71 [0.58:0.85] -
σNi Firms net wealth IG[0.10,2.00] 0.36 [0.28:0.45] 0.37 [0.26:0.47] -
σDi Deposit markdown IG[0.10,2.00] 0.30 [0.23:0.37] 0.64 [0.48:0.79] -
σBi Bank liabilities IG[0.10,2.00] 5.89 [4.63:7.10] 9.75 [7.95:11.57] -
σLi Credit markup IG[0.10,2.00] 2.31 [1.78:2.81] 2.09 [1.61:2.57] -
σR Monetary policy IG[0.10,2.00] - - 0.09 [0.07:0.10]
shock process ar(1)
ρAi Productivity B[0.50,0.20] 0.98 [0.97:0.99] 0.96 [0.91:1.00] -
ρGi Government spending B[0.50,0.20] 0.87 [0.82:0.93] 0.63 [0.44:0.82] -
ρUi Preferences B[0.50,0.20] 0.29 [0.08:0.49] 0.82 [0.67:0.96] -
ρIi Investment costs B[0.50,0.20] 0.79 [0.70:0.88] 0.68 [0.50:0.90] -
ρPi Firms markup B[0.50,0.20] 0.99 [0.99:1.00] 0.76 [0.54:0.95] -
ρWi Unions markup B[0.50,0.20] 0.49 [0.21:0.77] 0.16 [0.02:0.30] -
ρNi Firms net wealth B[0.50,0.20] 0.86 [0.81:0.90] 0.91 [0.87:0.95] -
ρDi Deposit markdown B[0.50,0.20] 0.88 [0.84:0.93] 0.90 [0.84:0.95] -
ρBi Bank liabilities B[0.50,0.20] 0.94 [0.90:0.99] 0.96 [0.93:0.99] -
ρLi Credit markup B[0.50,0.20] 0.71 [0.55:0.86] 0.68 [0.54:0.82] -
ρR Monetary policy B[0.50,0.20] - - 0.36 [0.25:0.48]
international shock correlation
corrAt Productivity N [0.20,0.20] - - 0.20 [0.01:0.40]
corrGt Government spending N [0.20,0.20] - - 0.13 [-0.06:0.33]
corrUt Preferences N [0.20,0.20] - - 0.07 [-0.12:0.26]
corrIt Investment costs N [0.20,0.20] - - 0.45 [0.28:0.63]
corrPt Firms markup N [0.20,0.20] - - 0.28 [0.10:0.47]
corrWt Unions markup N [0.20,0.20] - - 0.24 [0.08:0.42]
corrNt Firms net wealth N [0.20,0.20] - - 0.33 [0.15:0.51]
corrDt Deposit markdown N [0.20,0.20] - - 0.68 [0.56:0.81]
corrBt Bank liabilities N [0.20,0.20] - - 0.00 [-0.21:0.22]
corrLt Credit markup N [0.20,0.20] - - 0.81 [0.72:0.90]
structural parameters
σHi Labour disutility G[2.00,0.50] 0.79 [0.41:1.15] 1.96 [1.17:2.73] -
hCi Consumption habits B[0.70,0.10] 0.55 [0.42:0.69] 0.48 [0.34:0.62] -
θPi Calvo price B[0.50,0.10] 0.72 [0.67:0.78] 0.72 [0.62:0.82] -
ξPi Price indexation B[0.50,0.15] 0.22 [0.08:0.37] 0.23 [0.07:0.38] -
θWi Calvo wage B[0.50,0.10] 0.85 [0.79:0.91] 0.89 [0.85:0.93] -
ξWi Wage indexation B[0.50,0.15] 0.51 [0.35:0.67] 0.18 [0.10:0.25] -
θEi Employment elasticity B[0.50,0.10] 0.84 [0.81:0.86] 0.52 [0.18:0.74] -
θLi Calvo credit rate B[0.50,0.10] 0.71 [0.64:0.78] 0.74 [0.69:0.79] -
θDi Calvo deposit rate B[0.50,0.10] 0.79 [0.76:0.81] 0.73 [0.69:0.77] -
χIi Investment costs N [0.50,1.50] 6.59 [4.63:8.41] 7.83 [5.08:10.3] -
ψi Utilization elasticity B[0.50,0.10] 0.71 [0.62:0.80] 0.70 [0.58:0.82] -
κi External finance elasticity B[0.05,0.02] 0.13 [0.06:0.19] 0.09 [0.05:0.13] -
hLi Loan demand habits B[0.50,0.20] 0.79 [0.70:0.89] 0.91 [0.85:0.97] -
hBi Interbank habits B[0.50,0.20] 0.28 [0.07:0.48] 0.14 [0.02:0.26] -
αCi Goods market openness B[0.12,0.05] 0.08 [0.04:0.13] 0.14 [0.07:0.22] -
αIi Inv. market openness B[0.08,0.03] 0.05 [0.02:0.09] 0.08 [0.03:0.13] -
αLi Credit market openness B[0.10,0.04] 0.05 [0.02:0.08] 0.12 [0.05:0.18] -
αBi Interbank openness B[0.20,0.05] 0.38 [0.30:0.46] 0.32 [0.24:0.4] -
µ Substitutability goods G[1.50,0.50] - - 1.42 [0.99:1.83]
ρ MPR smoothing B[0.50,0.20] - - 0.84 [0.80:0.89]
φpi MPR inflation N [2.00,0.15] - - 1.65 [1.37:1.92]
φ∆y MPR GDP growth N [0.12,0.05] - - 0.08 [0.03:0.12]
Marginal log-likelihood -1199.2
Note: IG denotes the Inverse Gamma distribution, B the Beta, N the Normal, G the Gamma.
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Figure 6: Prior and posterior distributions of structural parameters.
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